noting that for the fraudulent concealment statute to apply, a plaintiff must have relied to her detriment on acts or representations calculated “to lull or induce [the] claimant into delaying [the] filing of his or her claim, or to prevent [the] claimant from 23 No. 1-21-1119 discovering a claim” in time to assert it
How later courts described this case
- noting that for the fraudulent concealment statute to apply, a plaintiff must have relied to her detriment on acts or representations calculated “to lull or induce [the] claimant into delaying [the] filing of his or her claim, or to prevent [the] claimant from 23 No. 1-21-1119 discovering a claim” in time to assert it
- holding that “[m]ere silence on the part of the defendant is insufficient” to justify applying section 13-215
- "there is a causal connection between plaintiff's 1989 hospitalization and blood transfusion and her current claim against Loyola. Accordingly, her claim arises out of patient care"
- acknowledging that “arising out of patient care” encompasses claims of fraud related to medical treatment
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurring:
The majority relies on this court’s decision in Brucker v. Mercola, 227 Ill. 2d 502 (2007), in concluding that the plaintiffs claim arises out of patient care. In Brucker, I agreed with the majority’s interpretation of the phrase “arising out of patient care.” Given the facts of Brucker, however, I disagreed with the application of that phrase because the majority placed insufficient emphasis on the fundamental “patient care” component. Brucker, 227 Ill. 2d at 551 (Kilbride, J., specially concurring).
In this case, I agree that the plaintiffs claim arises out of patient care. The blood transfusion was undoubtedly an integral component of plaintiffs medical care or treatment and, therefore, is within the plain meaning of “patient care.” See Stiffler, 965 F.2d at 141; Brucker, 227 Ill. 2d at 552-53 (Kilbride, J., specially concurring). Plaintiffs claim alleging harm from the failure to warn of a possible infection originated from the blood transfusion. Accordingly, plaintiffs claim arose out of patient care and falls within the scope of the medical malpractice statute of repose. Thus, I concur in the result reached by the majority despite its reliance on Brucker.