rejecting claim that adequacy claim is unreviewable on ground that “school funding lies exclusively within the dominion of the legislature” because, although “specific method of funding education is within the legislature’s realm, nevertheless, in the discharge of our constitutional obligations, we may be required to determine whether the legislative action is constitutionally valid”
How later courts described this case
- rejecting claim that adequacy claim is unreviewable on ground that “school funding lies exclusively within the dominion of the legislature” because, although “specific method of funding education is within the legislature’s realm, nevertheless, in the discharge of our constitutional obligations, we may be required to determine whether the legislative action is constitutionally valid”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FRIEDLANDER, Judge,
dissenting.
I disagree with the Majority’s conclusions that (1) the Education Clause encapsulates judicially discernible standards against which the appellants’ claims may be measured and (2) the judiciary should be the arbiter of disputes between the citizens of Indiana and their elected officials concerning the allocation of funds for public education. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I need not wax long or eloquent to explain the basis of my dissenting view. Put plainly, it is rooted in the separation of powers doctrine, which our Supreme Court has observed, “ensures that the fundamental functions of each branch of government remain inviolate.” Bonney v. Indiana Finance Authority, 849 N.E.2d 473, 482 (Ind.2006). Specifically relevant to this controversy, “[t]he legislative branch generally has control over appropriations. While we may find [the legislature’s appropriations decision] to be intolerable, we would find it even more intolerable for the judicial branch of government to invade the power of the legislative branch.” Id. In my view, this is exactly what this court is asked to review in this case — an appropriations decision by the legislature.
Long ago, in Robinson v. Schenck, 102 Ind. 307 , 1 N.E. 698 (1885), our Supreme Court addressed a somewhat different challenge filed by Indiana citizens with respect to legislative decisions made under the Education Clause. The difference between that challenge and this is not relevant for my purpose here, as the judicial response to both should be the same. In Robinson , the Supreme Court articulated it thus:
This provision imperatively enjoins the general duty upon the legislature, but leaves to them much discretion as to the selection of means for the efficient performance of that duty; and if the local agencies of government are employed to assist in building up the school system, there is no evasion of duty by the legislature. The legislature may, in their discretion, support all the schools of the state by means of a general levy directly made by a legislative act, or they may thus provide for part of the expense of maintaining the schools, or they may delegate to local officers the power to levy such taxes as in their judgment may be needed to supply the wants of the local schools and make them useful and effective. The duty rests on the legislature to adopt the best system that can be framed; but they, and not the courts, are to judge what is the best system.
Id. at 705 (emphasis supplied).
I believe the appellants’ lawsuit in this case asks us to sit in judgment of decisions *697 made by the Indiana Legislature that are firmly within the discretion accorded to that body by the Education Clause. Upon the same rationale articulated by our Supreme Court in Robinson , I would hold that such action is beyond our purview.