tax on all amusements in city was not limited to occupations, as the term is commonly used to mean profit- motivated, ongoing concerns and, thus, was not an occupation tax
How later courts described this case
- tax on all amusements in city was not limited to occupations, as the term is commonly used to mean profit- motivated, ongoing concerns and, thus, was not an occupation tax
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MR. JUSTICE SCHAEFER, concurring:
I agree that the tax is valid, but I reach that conclusion by a different route. Under our prior decisions, this tax is a tax upon an occupation. (See Stiska v. City of Chicago (1950), 405 Ill. 374 ; Greater Chicago Indoor Tennis Clubs, Inc. v. Village of Willowbrook (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 400 ; see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. ABC-Great States, Inc. (1972), 8 Ill. App. 3d 836, 838 .) The impact of the tax is upon the licensee, and the sanction for nonpayment of the tax is revocation of the license. The provision of the ordinance that “[t]he licensee may, if he desires, collect such amounts from each ticket holder, in addition to the amount or amounts charged for such ticket of admission” does not alter the nature of the tax.
But the fact that the tax is a tax upon occupations does not impair its validity, for this tax is one that the General Assembly has “by law” authorized any municipality — whether home rule or not — to impose. Section 11 — 42—5 of the Municipal Code provides:
“The corporate authorities of each municipality may license, tax, *** theatricals and other exhibitions, shows, and amusements ***.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 24, par. 11-42-5.
The only remaining question is whether the prohibitions contained in the “Racing Acts” referred to in the majority opinion precluded the imposition of this local amusement tax prior to January 1, 1976, when they were repealed. For the reasons stated in the majority opinion, I agree that they did not.