arrest for parking too far from curb; discovery of “policy” paraphernalia upheld on other grounds
How later courts described this case
- arrest for parking too far from curb; discovery of “policy” paraphernalia upheld on other grounds
- arrest for parking too far from curb; discovery of *145 “policy” paraphernalia upheld on other grounds
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Morrison, 57 Ill. App. 3d 468 (1978)
Defendant also contends that the facts here did not justify a belief on the part of the arresting officer that he was dealing with anyone more than an ordinary traffic violator, so that People v. Palmer (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 261, 342 N.E.2d 353, and People v. Watkins (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433, are distinguishable.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Daily, specially concurring:
While I agree that the search of defendant’s person in this case was constitutionally permissible, I do not agree that something more than a valid arrest itself, whether it be for a felony or a misdemeanor, is necessary to bring a search of the person within constitutional standards.
In the landmark case of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 , 58 L. ed. 652, 655, the Supreme Court said, without qualification or reservation, that the right has always been recognized under American and English law, “to search the person of the accused when legally arrested, to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime.” Subsequent decisions, notably Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 69 L. ed. 543, and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 , 94 L. ed. 653, have recognized and reaffirmed the Weeks case as firmly cementing the principle that a search of the person of one lawfully arrested is not unreasonable, and that the taking into custody of personal articles in the immediate control of an arrested person is not unlawful. (See also: Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 ; United States v. Lassoff, 149 F. Supp. 944 .) In the Rabinowitz case the court said: “It is unreasonable searches that are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. * * * It was recognized by the framers of the Constitution that there were reasonable searches for which no warrant was required. The right of the ‘people to be secure in their persons’ was certainly of as much concern to the framers of the Constitution as the property of the person. Yet no one questions the right, without a search warrant, to search the person after a valid arrest. The right to search the person incident to arrest has always been recognized in this country and in England. * * * Where one had been placed in custody of the law by valid action of officers, it was not unreasonable to search him.” ( 339 U.S. at 60 , 94 L. ed. at 657; emphasis supplied.) The same rule has been held to apply even where an arrest is made for a misdemeanor. See: Garske v. United States, (8th cir.) 1 F.2d 620 ; Green v. United States, (D.C. cir.) 259 F.2d 180 .
The decisions of this court in People v. Clark, 9 Ill.2d 400 , People v. Edge, 406 Ill. 490 , and others now overruled by the majority opinion, which hold that a search of the person is a proper incident to a valid arrest for traffic violations, do no more than to follow the principle of the Weeks case as it has been interpreted and extended by subsequent Federal and State decisions.
To justify a departure from the rule adhered to in the past, the majority opinion relies on Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203 (1938), 116 S.W.2d 1009 . In that case, however, where a motorist was lawfully arrested for reckless driving, it was the holding of the Tennessee court only that a search of the automobile was unreasonable in that it bore no relation to the offense for which the arrest was made. Making it clear that it would not have considered unreasonable a search of the motorist’s person, the court concluded its opinion as follows: “It will be borne in mind that this is not a case in which evidence of the commission of another and independent offense had been described by the officer incidental to the exercise of search within recognized authorized limits, as for example in the Goodwin case, supra, where a concealed weapon was found on the person * * *. We adhere to the rule heretofore followed in this court that, when the scope of the search is within lawful limits, discoveries of independent offenses may be testified to in prosecution of such offenses.” (Emphasis supplied.) Goodwin v. State, 148 Tenn. 682 (1924), 257 S.W. 79 , the decision referred to, was a prosecution for a concealed weapon that had been found on defendant’s person after his arrest for drunkenness. In holding that the search which produced the weapon was reasonable the court categorically states: “When the arrest is lawful the right to search the person follows.”
People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247 (1959), 97 N.W.2d 16 , which is also relied upon by the majority opinion, goes no farther than the Elliott case. The Michigan court neither considered nor passed upon the question whether there must be something more than a valid arrest to render a search of the person reasonable, but decided only that to permit the search of an automobile, there must be some justification other than the issuance of a ticket for a traffic offense.
The same is true of People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal.2d 114 (1956), 293 P.2d 57 . The court in that case held only that a double-parking violation would not justify a search of a vehicle, and did not even deal with a problem of whether a lawful arrest for such a violation would have carried with it authority to search the person of the one arrested.
In retrospect, it may be seen that none of the cases cited have either modified or rejected the rule that a search of the person is reasonable when one is lawfully arrested for a criminal offense. This being so, they hardly present a persuasive or compelling basis for a retreat from our holdings in People v. Clark, 9 Ill.2d 400 , and People v. Edge, 406 Ill. 490 , which are recognized as representing the majority view prevailing in this country: See: 1959 Wis. L. Rev. 347 , 357.
The opinion adopted by my colleagues concedes that protection of arresting officers from attack is one of the grounds that makes a search of the person a lawful incident to a valid arrest, but refuses to recognize its application here by rationalizing that we are dealing with a “minor traffic offense that ordinarily results in a 'parking ticket’ hung on the handle of the car, telling the offender that it is not necessary to appear in court if he mails in the amount of his fine.” This reasoning is erroneous. The mere hanging of a traffic citation on a car door is not an arrest. Moreover, we are dealing here with the situation where an officer confronts an offender face-to-face and detains him from going on his way. When experience has proved to the contrary, on occasions at the cost of the life of an arresting officer, it is illogical that we should establish by judicial fiat that all minor traffic offenders must be accepted by arresting officers as persons who pose no threat to their personal safety.
Arrests for traffic violations can have serious consequences in our society such as loss of driving privileges, substantial fines or confinement in jail, loss of employment or disqualification therefor, and we always have those cases in which an officer may unwittingly halt a stolen car for a minor violation, or confront a driver or occupant wanted for more serious violations. Human nature being what it is, we should not establish as a matter of law that none of these persons will react with violence. It is true that the great majority of arrests for traffic offenses result in no untoward incidents but, in seeking to determine what is reasonable, it seems to me that our concern should be directed to the safety and protection of law enforcement officers, rather than to the welfare of persons who have put their rights in forfeit by violating the law. The majority says that a search of the person is reasonable if an arresting officer has basis for suspicion that something more than a routine traffic violation is involved; but this can be of little solace or help to the officer who has no suspicions until the offender suddenly produces a weapon. The only practical view, as recognized by the majority of ancient and modern courts, is that it is not unreasonable to search the person of one who has been validly arrested.
To me the opinion adopted is also subject to the vice that it fosters uncertainty and confusion in an area where none should exist, and in fact did not exist heretofore. The only result can be harassment to law enforcement and the effective prosecution of crime, with corresponding detriment to the citizens of this State. In departing from the view that a search of the person is reasonable upon lawful arrest the court says, in effect, that the search of the person here is unlawful because the offense is a minor one. The reasonableness of the search is thus made to rest on the nature of the crime, rather than the fact of arrest itself. Neither law enforcement officials nor the public can know what crimes will justify a search of the person, and with the present opinion as a guide, the validity of all searches, even after arrest for some felonies, will be in doubt until judicially tested. In my opinion the historic approach that a search of the person is reasonable upon valid arrest is the more perceptive, just and logical view and should be retained in this jurisdiction.