concluding that knife at issue ‘‘does not fit the definition of a dirk, described as any stabbing weapon having two sharp edges and a point’’
How later courts described this case
- concluding that knife at issue ‘‘does not fit the definition of a dirk, described as any stabbing weapon having two sharp edges and a point’’
- insufficient evidence to support probable cause
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BEALES, J.,
dissenting.
I find that I must respectfully disagree with the majority opinion, as I believe the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find that the knife riveted to appellant’s car door was “a weapon of like kind” under Code § 18.2-308(A). In reaching this conclusion, I tend to agree with Judge Humphreys’s analysis in his dissent to the extent that the knife here is “a weapon of like kind” to a bowie knife. In addition, I agree with the portion of Judge Kelsey’s dissent that distinguishes Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 177 , 639 S.E.2d *417 227 (2007), from the circumstances presented by this case, particularly as Farrakhan only indicated an intent to use the kitchen knife as a weapon after he removed it from its place of concealment, id. at 180 , 689 S.E.2d at 229, whereas here, in contrast, McMillan admitted that he intended to use his rather menacing knife as a weapon for his protection when he concealed it in his vehicle. While I agree with the majority opinion that this admission alone is certainly not dispositive of whether the knife is actually a weapon, appellant’s admission is a probative factor to consider when determining if the evidence is sufficient to prove that the knife is a weapon. Therefore, when appellant’s admission is considered together with the other evidence in this case, I would find that the evidence is sufficient to prove the knife is a weapon.