rejecting “totality of the circumstances” test set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 [1983], and concluding that “principles developed under Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 [1964], and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), if not applied hypertechnically, provide a more appropriate structure for probable cause inquiries under art. 14” of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights
How later courts described this case
- rejecting “totality of the circumstances” test set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 [1983], and concluding that “principles developed under Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 [1964], and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), if not applied hypertechnically, provide a more appropriate structure for probable cause inquiries under art. 14” of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights
- discussing Leon but concluding that state statutes bar any judicial consideration of admitting evidence seized pursuant to search warrant issued in the absence of probable cause
- holding that “art. 14 provides more substantive protection to criminal defendants than does the Fourth Amendment in the determination of probable cause”
- reaffirming Sees, and, noting that “[t]he Constitution of the Commonwealth preceded and is independent of the Constitution of the United States,” listing numerous cases where the two constitutions have been read to diverge
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Lynch, J.
(dissenting, with whom Nolan, I., joins). For the reasons stated in my earlier dissent, Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562, 578 (1983), I believe probable cause existed here under the test of Illinois v. Gates. Furthermore, I find nothing in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights or G. L. c. 276, § 2B, that mandates a stricter standard for determining whether probable cause exists than is found in the United States Constitution. Because I believe probable cause exists, I would not reach the issue whether G. L. c. 276, § 2B, provides a statutory prohibition against the admission of evidence seized under a warrant issued without probable cause. I therefore respectfully dissent.