stating that post-conviction rules create a narrow remedy for subsequent collateral challenges to convictions
How later courts described this case
- stating that post-conviction rules create a narrow remedy for subsequent collateral challenges to convictions
- no ineffectiveness based on failure to challenge jury instruction on possible penalties in lieu of death sentence because "[a]n attorney may reasonably desire not to remind a jury deliberating a death sentence that the defendant was found guilty of another serious felony in addition to murder,” and no contrary evidence as to counsel's motives
- failure to raise challenge to death penalty statute on ground that a finding of probable cause was required before State could use a death qualified jury was not ineffective assistance of counsel in light of Lockhart v. McCree
- "I do not believe I should refrain from participation in the reweighing exercise directed by the majority on the ground that I would not have designed the process to include it. For that reason I concur in all portions of the opinion [and] concur in result as to part III.... Having explained this position, I do not expect to find it necessary to reiterate it in future cases...."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BOEHM, Justice,
concurring.
For the reasons stated in my dissent in Lambert v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1060 (Ind.1996), I believe that a procedurally defective sentencing order in a death penalty case should require remand for resentencing. Based on this record I cannot conclude that the sentencing decisions of the court were unaffected by the questionnaire described in the court’s majority opinion. It appears more probable than not that the questionnaire was never communicated to the parties. In a matter as sensitive as a death penalty proceeding, the greatest care must be taken to afford all parties the opportunity to present their issues in a full and fair proceeding. The slightest ex parte communication runs the risk of tainting the proceeding. Howev *911 er, I do not believe I should refrain from participation in the • reweighing exercise directed by the majority on the ground that I would not have designed the process to include it. For that reason I concur in all portions of the opinion, except as to part III, and concur in result as to part III.
Having explained this position, I do not expect to find it necessary to reiterate it in future cases in the unhappy but foreseeable circumstance that the same issue presents itself again.