joining the majority of states that recognize the tort of invasion of privacy as inherent in property, contract and liberty rights, but declining to recognize the tort of false light because it would increase the tension between tort law and constitutional free speech guaranties
How later courts described this case
- joining the majority of states that recognize the tort of invasion of privacy as inherent in property, contract and liberty rights, but declining to recognize the tort of false light because it would increase the tension between tort law and constitutional free speech guaranties
- concluding that Min- nesota common law recognizes causes of action in tort for “intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation, and publication of private facts”
- concluding that “we are not persuaded that a new cause of action should be recognized if little additional protection is afforded plaintiffs”
- stating that “[o]ne’s naked body is ... generally known to others only by choice” and “is a type of privacy interest worthy of protection”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
TOMLJANOVICH, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. If the allegations against Wal-Mart are proven to be true, the conduct of the Wal-Mart employees is indeed offensive and reprehensible. As much as we deplore such conduct, not every contemptible act in our society is actionable.
I would not recognize a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation or publication of private facts. “Minnesota has never recognized, either by legislative or court action, a cause of action for invasion of privacy.” Hendry v. Conner, 303 Minn. 317, 319 , 226 N.W.2d 921, 923 (1975). As recently as. 1996, we reiterated that position. See Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 28 (Minn.1996).
An action for an invasion of the right to privacy is not rooted in the Constitution. “[Tjhe Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’ ” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Those privacy rights that have their origin in the Constitution are much more fundamental rights of privacy — marriage and reproduction. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) (penumbral rights of privacy and repose protect notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship and reproduction).
We have become a much more litigious society since 1975 when we acknowledged that we have never recognized a cause of action for invasion of privacy. We should be *237 even more reluctant now to recognize a new tort.
In the absence of a constitutional basis, I would leave to the legislature the decision to create a new tort for invasion of privacy.
STRINGER, Justice.
I join in the dissent of Justice TOMLJA-NOVICH.