stating that to establish “cause,” “a prisoner need show only that his PCR [post-conviction relief] counsel performed in a deficient manner” and “need not show actual prejudice resulting from his PCR counsel’s deficient performance, over and above his required showing that the trial-counsel IAC claim be ‘substantial’ under the first Martinez requirement”
How later courts described this case
- stating that to establish “cause,” “a prisoner need show only that his PCR [post-conviction relief] counsel performed in a deficient manner” and “need not show actual prejudice resulting from his PCR counsel’s deficient performance, over and above his required showing that the trial-counsel IAC claim be ‘substantial’ under the first Martinez requirement”
- stating that a prisoner "need not show actual prejudice resulting from his PCR counsel's deficient performance, over and above his required showing that the trial-counsel IAC claim [is] 'substantial' under the first Martinez requirement”
- observing that this reading is required to square the requirement with the structure of Martinez
- noting that it is “standard practice . . . to remand to the district court for a decision in the first instance without requiring any special justification for so doing”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022)
740 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), overruled in part on other grounds by Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366
The opinion
WATFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
I agree with the majority that we should grant petitioner’s motion to remand the case to the district court, so that the district court can determine in the first instance whether petitioner’s procedural default may be excused under Martinez v. Ryan, —U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1309 , 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012). As the dueling opinions in this case confirm, assessing whether petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims have “some merit” under Martinez, id. at 1318 , requires a highly fact- and record-intensive analysis. Allowing the district court to undertake that analysis first is generally the more prudent course. A remand in such circumstances does not merely conserve judicial resources, although that is a particularly important consideration when, as here, we are convened as an en banc court. It also helps to improve the quality of our review process by providing an initial determination that may narrow the bounds of disagreement, and that at a minimum enables the parties to articulate their positions more effectively based on a common point of departure. Since this is a court of review, “not first view,” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 , 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2565 , 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), I see no need at this point for us to say anything more than that petitioner’s motion to remand is granted.