concerning the change in a law providing for a six person jury rather than one consisting of twelve jurors
How later courts described this case
- concerning the change in a law providing for a six person jury rather than one consisting of twelve jurors
- statutory amendment providing for six-person jury did not violate ex post facto clause, as “no substantial right was affected”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the affirmance of this conviction. I disagree, however, with the majority's conclusion that application of the six-person jury amendment to 1.0. 35-1-80-1 "was unquestionably retrospective in effect." (Slip Opinion, page 15)
The amendment took effect after commission of the crime charged but did not affect the elements of that crime or the punishment attributable to the crime. The amendment took effect prior to the commencement of the trial. As of the date of the amendment it was entitled to prospective application to all trials commencing thereafter. In this regard, our case differs from Warner v. State (1976) 265 Ind. 262 , 354 N.E.2d 178 . That case involved a detrimental change in the permissible punish ment for the crime committed. The "triggering event", as alluded to in that case, was quite obviously the commission of the crime. -It is the trial, in the case before us, which is the crucial event. See Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24 at 29-30 , 101 S.Ct. 960 at 964 .
In light of the overruling of Thompson v. Utah (1898) 170 U.S. 343 , 18 S.Ct. 620 , 42 L.Ed. 1061 , I do not believe that there are any ex post facto connotations in this case whatever.