The doctrine of in pari materia “is also applicable to different sections of the same statute and is consonant with one of our fundamental rules of statutory construction–‘to view all of the provisions of a statute as a whole.’ [Citation.]”
How later courts described this case
- The doctrine of in pari materia “is also applicable to different sections of the same statute and is consonant with one of our fundamental rules of statutory construction–‘to view all of the provisions of a statute as a whole.’ [Citation.]”
- “Because review of a final administrative decision may only be obtained as provided by statute, a court is said to exercise ‘special statutory jurisdiction’ when it reviews an administration decision.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also dissenting:
I agree with Justice Fitzgerald’s dissent that section 3 — 105 controls in this appeal. I write separately to explain that, even if the exception in section 3 — 107 were applicable, the conditions for application of that exception have not been met in this case. The appellate court’s dismissal of the complaint for administrative review should be affirmed in either case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The majority concludes that the exception contained in section 3 — 107 of the Administrative Review Law (Review Law) allows the school districts an opportunity to name and serve the members of the Committee of Ten as defendants. 218 Ill. 2d at 194. The exception in section 3 — 107 only applies, however, if the party who was not made a defendant “was not named by the administrative agency in its final order as a party of record.” 735 ILCS 5/3 — 107(a) (West 2000). The majority finds this exception applies because the Board’s order failed to identify the petitioners as parties of record. 218 Ill. 2d at 194-95. The majority notes that the caption of the order did not identify the parties, and the text of the order did not identify any of the individual petitioners or members of the Committee of Ten by name. 218 Ill. 2d at 195.
I disagree with the conclusion that the order did not sufficiently identify the members of the Committee of Ten as parties of record within the meaning of the Review Law. The body of the order recites, in pertinent part, that “the Petition was signed by more than two-thirds (2/3) of the legal registered voters of the area involved, that a Committee of Ten was appointed in the Petition and that the legal requirements set forth in 105 Illinois Compiled Statutes 5/7 have been met by the Petitioners.” Under the School Code, a committee of 10 is a group of petitioners designated in the petition as attorney in fact for all of the petitioners. 105 ILCS 5/7— 6(c) (West 2000). Thus, the order, by referring to the appointment of the Committee of Ten, identifies the members of that group as petitioners. Under any characterization, the petitioners are parties of record. As noted by the majority, the petitioners were “clearly parties of record.” 218 Ill. 2d at 183. Thus, the order is sufficient to identify the members of the Committee of Ten as petitioners and as parties of record.
In my view, the majority gives the exception in section 3 — 107 too broad of a construction. The majority would apparently require that each member of the Committee of Ten must be specifically named and referred to as “a party of record” for the exception not to apply. I believe the exception should be construed more narrowly. The identification of the Committee of Ten as petitioners in the order was sufficient to name the members of that group as parties of record. Thus, the exception in section 3 — 107 that would allow the school districts to add the members of the Committee of Ten as defendants is not applicable based on the facts of this case.
I would also note that the circumstances of this case show this construction of the exception cannot be considered unfair or “a trap for the unwary.” See Chestnut v. Lodge, 34 Ill. 2d 567, 571 (1966) (Review Law “was not intended to be a trap for the unwary”). The petitioners, who were represented by the Committee of Ten, instituted the proceedings. The Committee of Ten represented the petitioners throughout these proceedings. The record shows there were three separate hearings before the Board on this petition. The attorney for the petitioners appeared at each of these hearings. Julia Martinez, one of the members of the Committee of Ten, testified during the proceedings. The Board members referred to “the petitioners” repeatedly throughout the hearings. The entire administrative proceeding focused on the petition, prominently identifying the members of the Committee of Ten by name on page one. The petition specifically states “[tjhe following Petitioners are designated as the Committee of Ten to act as attorney in fact for all Petitioners.” In sum, the record is replete with references to the petitioners and the Committee of Ten.
Based on these facts, the school districts cannot claim that they did not know that the members of the Committee of Ten were parties of record. The status of the members of the Committee of Ten as parties of record could not be more apparent. Thus, denying the school districts additional time to add the members of the Committee of Ten as defendants would not be unfair.
Finally, as noted by both Justice Fitzgerald and Justice Garman, section 3 — 105 clearly required the school districts to serve each member of the Committee of Ten. 218 Ill. 2d at 201-02 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting); 218 Ill. 2d at 197 (Garman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The school districts failed to serve the members of the Committee of Ten when this action was initiated. Additionally, after the school districts were granted leave to add the members of the Committee of Ten as defendants, the school districts were obligated to arrange for the service of the defendants. Nonetheless, according to the record, the school districts completely failed to serve the members of the Committee of Ten— even after they were granted leave to add these parties as defendants. In failing to serve the committee members, the school districts failed to comply strictly with the Review Law.
In sum, this appeal should be resolved based on application of section 3 — 105 as explained in Justice Fitzgerald’s dissent. However, even if the exception in section 3 — 107 were applicable to this appeal, the conditions for application of that exception have not been met. Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court dismissing the complaint for administrative review should be affirmed.