explaining that when faced with question of capacity to rule fairly, judge must first consult his own emotions and conscience, and then attempt objective appraisal whether his impartiality might reasonably be questioned
How later courts described this case
- explaining that when faced with question of capacity to rule fairly, judge must first consult his own emotions and conscience, and then attempt objective appraisal whether his impartiality might reasonably be questioned
- concluding that damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress under c. 93A are recoverable and subject to multiple damages
- feelings of anger, loneliness, and helplessness leading to protracted periods of withdrawal and physical pain
- holding that isolated statements of judge, viewed in the context of a fourteen-day trial, did not support a claim of bias
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*874 Lynch, J.
(dissenting in part, with whom Nolan and O’Connor, JJ., join). I disagree with the holding that the Consumer Protection Act, G. L. c. 93A (1990 ed.), may be invoked to double or treble damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. I respectfully dissent from that portion of the court’s opinion.
The court correctly notes we have held that “under the amended version of § 9 (1) the invasion of any legally protected right [is] compensable.” Ante 865. See Leardi v. Brown, 394 Mass. 151, 159 (1985). The infliction of emotional distress is a tort (in these circumstances) only when the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress, or knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 555 (1982). Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 145 (1976). In other words, for there to be the invasion of a legally protected right the plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly.
If this standard sounds familiar, that is because it echoes the showing of a “willful or knowing” violation upon which c. 93A conditions the multiplication of damages. The statute provides, in relevant part, that damages for a successful petitioner “shall be ... up to three but not less than two times [actual or nominal damages] if the court finds that the use or employment of the act or practice [complained of] was a willful or knowing violation of [c. 93A, § 2] . . . .” G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3). The wilful conduct in this case is what makes the plaintiff’s emotional distress compensable. If c. 93A is applied mechanically, therefore, once a plaintiff establishes that she is entitled to actual damages in this context, then ordinarily she also will have established — without more — that she is entitled to double or treble damages under the statute. As the court reads it, c. 93A will convert virtually every consumer’s recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress into a recovery of multiple dam *875 ages. This result disregards legislative intent, and frustrates the structure of the statute. Nevertheless, the court concludes that it is compelled by the plain language of c. 93A. I disagree.
“The general and familiar rule is that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.’’ Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934). Accord Dighton v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 399 Mass. 687 , 694 (1987); G.J.T., Inc. v. Boston Licensing Bd., 397 Mass. 285, 293 (1986). Ordinarily, if the language of a statute is unambiguous, it is conclusive as to “the purpose of its framers.” See, e.g., Boston Neighborhood Taxi Ass’n v. Department of Pub. Utils., ante 686; Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37 (1977). It is not the plain meaning of the statute, however, that drives the court to its conclusion, but the incremental logic of our own decisions superimposed upon the statutory language to achieve a result not contemplated by, and beyond the design of, the legislative enactment. Moreover, “time and again we have stated that we should not accept the literal meaning of the words of a statute without regard for that statute’s purpose and history.” Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 397 Mass. 837, 839 (1986), and cases cited. Accord Quincy City Hosp. v. Rate Setting Comm’n, 406 Mass. 431, 443 (1990).
The purpose of the multiple damages provision of c. 93A is no mystery. The provision reflects “the Legislature’s displeasure with the proscribed conduct and its desire to deter such conduct and encourage vindicative lawsuits.” McGrath v. Mishara, 386 Mass. 74, 85 (1982). According to the principal draftsman of the statute, the damages provisions of c. 93A are intended to remove economic disincentives to con *876 sumer actions, which typically involve small dollar amounts. Rice, New Private Remedies for Consumers: The Amendment of Chapter 93A, 54 Mass. L.Q. 307, 317 (1969). Thus the statute provides for liquidated minimum damages and attorneys’ fees as well as double and treble damages. C. 93A, §§ 9 (3) & (4). However, the multiplication of damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress does not serve the purpose of transforming petty lawsuits into cost-justified ones. Because such damages are available only for severe emotional distress, infra at 13-15, Payton, supra, Agis, supra, such claims by definition are significant, and it is unnecessary to augment the damages to fulfil the aim of the provision.
Nor does the award of double or treble damages in this case fit the structure of c. 93A. The statute explicitly links liability for multiple damages to a degree of culpability greater than that which justifies the award of actual damages. See International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 853 (1983). Having won actual damages, c. 93A requires a petitioner to demonstrate an additional element, wilfulness or knowledge, to earn multiple damages. Today’s ruling collapses the two findings into one.
This conflict with the structure of the statute is no mere technicality; it belies the fundamental illogic and unfairness of today’s ruling. The statute permits the award of double or treble damages as a penalty for the defendant’s wilfulness or knowledge in committing an unfair or deceptive act. Id. at 856 . The award of actual damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress also accounts for the perpetrator’s state of mind. See Payton, supra at 547, 554-555 . Thus, the reason for awarding double or treble damages is absent in this context because, with the award of actual damages, the defendant’s culpable state of mind has already been penalized. -The piling on of multiple damages without justification is, at the least, unfair.
Worse, it is unnecessary. The court’s wooden rationale for multiplying damages in this case is, The statute says so. Ante 869-870. The opinion ignores the main objective behind the *877 multiple damages provision. The intent of the multiple damages provision of c. 93A was not to shower petitioners with damages for a culpable state of mind already compensated by the award of actual damages. I respectfully dissent.