noting that, although Illinois recognizes a retaliatory discharge claim, it has “never recognized a common law tort for any injury short of actual discharge”
How later courts described this case
- noting that, although Illinois recognizes a retaliatory discharge claim, it has “never recognized a common law tort for any injury short of actual discharge”
- we will rely solely on the plain language of a statute if the legislative intent can be determined from that language
- finding no implied private right of action under Illinois whistleblower statute
- court declined to imply a private cause of action for whistleblowers from section 19c.l of the Personnel Code (20 ILCS 415/19c.l (West 2002)), which prohibited retaliation against state employees for reporting violations of “ ‘any law, rule, or regulation’ ” or “ ‘mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, and abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to pubic health or safety’ ” because the statute was primarily intended to protect the public by providing efficient government administration, and because no civil remedy was provided by the statute for those employees injured by its violations
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
I strongly disagree with Justice Rarick’s contention that the analysis employed in Fisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 455 (1999), was an “analytical error” (209 Ill. 2d at 47) (Rarick, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, I do agree with Justice Rarick that relevant distinctions exist between the Personnel Code and the Nursing Home Care Act, which was at issue in Fisher. Accordingly, I believe that Fisher does not dictate the result in this case, and I agree with Justice Rarick that the appropriate result in this case would be to imply a private right of action for the violation of the Personnel Code’s whistle-blower statute (20 ILCS 415/19c.1 (West 2002)).