Opinion

Garafano v. Neshobe Beach Club, Inc.

  • 126 Vt. 566
  • 238 A.2d 70
  • 1967 Vt. LEXIS 242
Court
Supreme Court of Vermont
Filed
Dec 5, 1967
Status
Published
Author
Holden
On the bench
Holden, C. J., and Shangraw, Barney, Smith and Keyser
Cited by
36 cases
Authority
More cited than 0.3%

holding an owner to a higher, more active duty of care for a business invitee that the owner has induced to enter the premises

How later courts described this case

  • holding an owner to a higher, more active duty of care for a business invitee that the owner has induced to enter the premises
  • noting that owner of business was “bound to use reasonable care to keep its premises in a safe and suitable condition so that plaintiff would not be unnecessarily or unreasonably exposed to danger”
  • noting that questions around breach of care are “questions of fact . . . clearly for resolution by the jury”
  • “The liability of an owner or occupant of real estate in reference to injuries caused by a dangerous or defective condition of the premises depends in general upon his having control of the property. In fact, such liability depends upon control, rather than ownership, of the premises.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Holden, C.J.

(concurring in part).

I concur with the majority that the trial court correctly granted the defendant Tailby’s motion for a directed verdict. I agree too that it was error to withhold from the jury the question of Neshobe’s liability, as the owner of the land where the injury occurred. But as I view the record, there was also a question for the jury on the issue of negligence on the part of the defendant Rutland Chamber of Commerce.

This defendant, though neither landowner nor tenant, was present on the land, acting with the possessor’s consent and authority. See Restatement, Torts 2d §383a. It did so at its own instigation.

The fact that the plaintiff and this defendant were both invitees of the landowner does not absolve the Chamber for liability. A licensee may be charged with a duty to other persons on the land, although the licensor is not. Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 100 Vt. 414, 417 , 139 A. 440 . 56 A.L.R. 1011 .

*576 The evidence establishes that the Chamber of Commerce was' the sponsor of the project to advance its own objectives. It issued the invitation to the plaintiff, gave the details of the program and established “the rules of the steak roast.” All this was done under the supervision of its managing director. And its members organized the ball game.

In undertaking to sponsor an athletic event, the Chamber of Commerce was called upon to use reasonable care in all matters connected with the enterprise for the reasonable protection of its invitees, whether spectators or participants. Dusckiewicz v. Carter, 115 Vt. 122, 126 , 52 A.2d 788 ; Killary v. Burlington-Lake Champlain Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 123 Vt. 256, 265 , 186 A.2d 170 .

The sponsor’s status, as a licensee, will not excuse it from this requirement in an action by an injured invitee. Rouillard v. Canadian Klondike Club, Inc., 316 Mass. 11 , 54 N.E.2d 680, 681 . Neither will the fact that the landowner had an equivalent duty in this regard necessarily relieve his licensee. Either one, or both may be legally responsible, according to the nature of their control. Klinsky v. Hanson Van Winkle Manning Co., 38 N.J.Super. 439 , 119 A.2d 166, 171 .

The record before us permits the inference that the Chamber of Commerce not only issued the invitation, but assumed some degree of control of the place and events to which the plaintiff was invited. To my mind, this is sufficient to charge the defendant with recognition that harm would come to the plaintiff, if the area where the competition was to take place should be unsafe. And if its representatives knew, or should have known, by reasonable vigilance, that the playing field contained areas of danger, the Chamber of Commerce was called upon to correct or warn, according to its authority in the premises. For these reasons, I think it was for the jury to determine whether this defendant had control of the situation to such a degree that it could have averted the danger by the exercise of reasonable precaution.

I am authorized to say Shangraw, J., joins me in this opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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