concluding "the principle set forth in Gilmer should apply to employment discrimination disputes under the [District of Columbia] Human Rights Act, and we thus hold that agreements to arbitrate employment discrimination claims are enforceable.”
How later courts described this case
- concluding "the principle set forth in Gilmer should apply to employment discrimination disputes under the [District of Columbia] Human Rights Act, and we thus hold that agreements to arbitrate employment discrimination claims are enforceable.”
- concluding that arbitration is an alternative to litigation expressly encouraged by Section 118 and the language of the section in no way suggests that the rule of Gilmer should no longer apply
- noting that in interpreting the DCHRA, the D.C. Court of Appeals has "generally looked to cases from the federal courts involving claims brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for guidance and have adopted those precedents when appropriate”
- applying Gilmer principles to enforcement of arbitration agreements on claims under DCHRA
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FERREN, Acting Chief Judge,
concurring:
I join in the opinion for the court because I can discern no basis in the Human Rights Act or in its legislative history for concluding that the Council of the District of Columbia intended to bar voluntary agreements to arbitrate employment discrimination claims. I am concerned, however, that such agreements could, in some circumstances, amount to contracts of adhesion forced on employees, with the result that enforcement of the arbitration provision would be unconscionable. In such circumstances, the employee may well have a basis for asking the court to void the arbitration clause and to permit a jury trial on the discrimination claim. Nothing we say today precludes that possibility.