finding "a clear question for the jury as to whether the defendant's driving too fast for conditions was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's alleged injuries"
How later courts described this case
- finding "a clear question for the jury as to whether the defendant's driving too fast for conditions was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's alleged injuries"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE BARRY, specially concurring:
Although I agree with the majority that the judgment in favor of defendant should be reversed and this cause remanded, I do not agree with one of the holdings of the majority. In my view the trial court erred in denying plaintiff’s motion for directed verdict and judgment n.o.v.
In Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 , 229 N.E.2d 504, 513-14 , the supreme court said:
“In our judgment verdicts ought to be directed and judgments n.o.v. entered only in those cases in which all the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.”
This is the “Pedrick rule” which a reviewing court must use in considering the evidence.
As the majority notes, this court held in Gullberg v. Blue (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 389 , 406 N.E.2d 927 , that pleading guilty to a traffic violation is not alone sufficient to establish negligence but rather is one of the facts to be considered by the jury. In Gullberg v. Blue we went on to find that a judgment n.o.v. was properly entered by the trial court under the Pedrick standard, and we said:
“The jury concluded that the defendant was not negligent; however, such a conclusion cannot stand, for based upon his own testimony the defendant did not apply his brakes until it was too late to bring his own vehicle under control. The evidence fails to disclose any intervening parties, events or factors which would support a finding that the defendant was not the proximate cause of the collision. A driver approaching from the rear has a duty to keep a safe lookout and must take into consideration the fact that he may be required to stop or slow his vehicle suddenly. Failure to maintain a safe lookout for traffic ahead constitutes negligence on the part of a driver.” 85 Ill. App. 3d 389, 392 , 406 N.E.2d 927, 930 .
I think the evidence in the case before us indicates that defendant was the proximate cause of the collision. She was familiar with the highway and with the congested traffic conditions which were usual along this route. She was traveling within one-half to one car length behind a high truck which she could not see around. She suddenly came upon plaintiffs stopped car in front of her and was unable to stop in time to avoid hitting that car. Obviously when she regulated her speed and her distance from the truck she was following, she did not take into account her limited forward visibility and the fact that she might be required to stop suddenly. When the pickup truck swerved, defendant diverted her attention from the road ahead and watched the truck go into the ditch. In spite of the extra distance between her car and plaintiff’s, by the time defendant saw plaintiff, she could not prevent a collision.
The circumstances of this case are similar to those in Burroughs v. McGinness where a rear-end collision occurred when the defendant was distracted by traffic to his left so that he did not see the plaintiff’s slow-moving car until he was too close to avoid striking it. The plaintiff had slowed down because the car in front óf him was turning. The appellate court in Burroughs reversed the judgment for defendant and said:
“The evidence, even when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the defendant, clearly established defendant’s negligence by his failure to be alert as to the traffic preceding him.” Burroughs v. McGinness (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 664, 669 , 380 N.E.2d 37, 40 .
In Glenn v. Mosley a directed verdict in favor of defendant was reversed on appeal, with the reviewing court stating:
“A motorist who does not maintain a proper lookout for traffic ahead is negligent.
*** A driver approaching from the rear has the duty to keep a safe lookout to avoid colliding with the vehicle ahead and he must take into account the prospect of having to stop his car suddenly.” Glenn v. Mosely (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 172, 176 , 350 N.E.2d 219, 222 .
On the basis of the law as stated in these cases, the factual situation in this case seems a compelling one for entry of a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. in favor of plaintiff. I would reverse the judgment and remand with directions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and to have a new trial on the issue of damages.