holding that where constitutionally permissible, full probative value is to be given to an extrajudicial identification, even if the witness who identified the defendant outside of court failed to do so in court
How later courts described this case
- holding that where constitutionally permissible, full probative value is to be given to an extrajudicial identification, even if the witness who identified the defendant outside of court failed to do so in court
- following Nassar but holding that officer could properly testify that photograph chosen by witness depicted defendant because defendant’s appearance had changed since time of robbery
- police officer’s testimony could aid jury in identifying person in photograph as defendant where officer testified that he had known defendant for long time and had seen him often, and defendant testified that he had lost twenty-five pounds since date photograph was taken
- "extrajudicial identification may be used substantively even when the witness is unable or unwilling to make an in-court identification" [emphasis supplied]
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Kaplan, J.
(concurring). When, in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421 (1974), the court was approving *465 the forensic use of polygraph results, thus departing from Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266 (1963), the dissenting Justices ventured to doubt that the question was best resolved by applying only the usual process of judicial lucubration. They suggested that a suitable team should be asked to undertake a study which, if favorable to the general idea of admitting evidence deriving from the polygraph technique, could propose court rules laying down definite limits and detailed procedures. There was another suggestion, that if the question was indeed to be answered solely through judicial decision, it would be peculiarly important to follow and in due course to describe and assess the consequences as they emerged in actual practice at the trial court level. I continue to regret that the opportunity for rule making was lost and no attempt at follow-up was inaugurated. Failing either kind of aid, caution is called for in the case by case elaboration of the subject, and in that light the main opinion herein has some considerable virtues. It describes certain features of the polygraph method which should discourage any routine acceptance of polygraph results, and on analysis it trims down the purposes for which those materials may be admitted in evidence. I concur, although with misgivings as to whether the analysis would not justify rather more stringent limitations.