holding where the state has waived sovereign immunity, and then enters an agreement settling the claims subject to that waiver, the state cannot assert sovereign immunity as a basis to avoid enforcement of the settlement
How later courts described this case
- holding where the state has waived sovereign immunity, and then enters an agreement settling the claims subject to that waiver, the state cannot assert sovereign immunity as a basis to avoid enforcement of the settlement
- holding that when a governmental entity is exposed to suit because of a waiver of immunity, it cannot settle that suit and subsequently deny waiver of immunity for enforcement thereof
- holding “when a governmental entity is exposed to suit because of waiver of immunity, it cannot nullify that waiver by settling the claim with an agreement on which it cannot be sued” (emphasis added)
- reaffirming that "waiver of governmental immunity is a matter addressed to the Legislature”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by City of Midlothian, Texas v. ECOM Real Estate Management, Inc. (2010)
San Antonio Court’s reasoning that Lawson is inapplicable absent a
Distinguished by Smith v. Tillman, 2006 Ala. LEXIS 321 (2006)
Lawson is distinguishable, as Tillman points out, by reason of the unique provisions of Texas law at issue in that case for which there are no Alabama counterparts.
Distinguished by City of Arlington, Texas v. Charles H. Matthews (2006)
Lawson is inapposite because the
The opinion
Justice ENOCH
filed a concurring opinion.
I join the Court’s judgment, but only because I maintain that the Legislature, by authorizing state agencies to enter into contracts, has expressly waived sovereign immunity. 1 The University executed the settlement agreement; thus it may not interpose sovereign immunity as a defense to suit on the agreement.
The Court struggles to tie the waiver of sovereign immunity underlying the Whis-tleblower Act cause of action, which was settled, to the current litigation over the settlement agreement. The dissent responds that the Court sidesteps our traditional rule that the enforcement of a settlement agreement is a separate breach-of-contract action. 2 This is an unnecessary argument that arises solely because the Court refuses to recognize, though virtually all other state jurisdictions have, that by *524 entering into a contract, the state waives sovereign immunity. 3
I concur in the Court’s judgment.
. See Federal Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 416 (Tex.1997) (Enoch, J., dissenting); see also Travis County v. Pelzel & Assoc. Inc., 77 S.W.3d 246, 252 (Tex.2002) (Enoch, J., dissenting); Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 863 (Tex.2002) (Enoch, J., dissenting); Gen. Serv. Comm’n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co. Inc., 39 S.W.3d 591, 602 (Tex.2001) (Enoch, J., dissenting); Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Aer-Aerotron, Inc., 39 S.W.3d 220, 221 (Tex.2001) (Enoch, J., dissenting).
. See Tex. A & M Univ.-Kingsville v. Lawson, 87 S.W.3d 518, 524 (Tex.2002) (Rodriguez, J., dissenting); see also Mantas v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 925 S.W.2d 656, 658-59 (Tex.1996).
. See Federal Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 419 (Enoch, J., dissenting).