holding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails where the issue underlying that claim is not meritorious such that no prejudice was suffered due to counsel’s failure to raise it
How later courts described this case
- holding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails where the issue underlying that claim is not meritorious such that no prejudice was suffered due to counsel’s failure to raise it
- observing that “the defendant's psychological and social history and his emotional and mental health are often of vital importance to the jury's decision at the punishment phase!;] .. . [c]ounsel must compile extensive historical data, as well as obtain a thorough physical and neurological examination.”
- "defendant has not presented, nor do we perceive independently, any State constitutional basis for departing from our prior cases and the now-consistent Supreme Court position on the issue"
- “unless the underlying issues are meritorious, defendant obviously suffered no prejudice due to appellate counsel’s failure to raise them on direct appeal.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE MILLER, concurring:
I concur in the judgment of the court, and I join much of the court’s opinion. Unlike the majority, however, I would reject the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the second stage of the sentencing hearing squarely on the ground that the defendant, acting pro se at that time, can make no claim that counsel was ineffective. See McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984), 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n.8, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122 , 133 n.8, 104 S. Ct. 944 , 950 n.8; Faretta v. California (1975), 422 U.S. 806 , 834 n.46, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 , 581 n.46, 95 S. Ct. 2525 , 2541 n.46, People v. Gibson (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 362, 382 .
Six days before trial, the defendant chose to proceed pro se. The two public defenders who had been representing the defendant were then appointed to act as standby counsel. Following the defendant’s conviction for murder and aggravated kidnapping, the State asked for a death penalty hearing. For the first stage of the sentencing hearing, the defendant requested the assistance of counsel, and the two public defenders represented him during that portion of the case. At the second stage of the hearing, however, the defendant once more waived the assistance of counsel, and the two public defenders again acted only as standby counsel. The only evidence in mitigation presented by the defendant was the testimony of a clergyman. (People v. Coleman (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 321, 331 .) The defendant now contends that additional evidence in mitigation could have been introduced at the death penalty hearing.
To avoid the principle that a person proceeding pro se may not later complain that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant attempts to couch the present argument in terms of the attorneys’ failure to adequately prepare for the sentencing hearing during the period when they were still representing him. Thus, the defendant states in his reply brief that counsel in this case "neglected to obtain [mitigating] evidence in a manner which would allow it to be introduced at the sentencing hearing and thereby prevented the Petitioner from having any chance of presenting such evidence after the Attorneys’ discharge.” Nowhere, however, does the defendant explain in what way the conduct of his former attorneys actually prevented him from introducing evidence in mitigation. This is not a case in which former counsel’s conduct later precluded a defendant, then pro se, from introducing evidence, presenting a motion, or doing anything else. Here, the defendant seeks merely to ¿void the consequences of his decision to represent himself during the second stage of the sentencing hearing.
To succeed on a claim of this nature, the defendant should be required to establish, at the least, that actions of the defense attorneys prior to their withdrawal from the case actually prevented the defendant from accomplishing something he would otherwise have been able to do while acting pro se. To suggest otherwise means that counsel not only must prepare, on the schedule they determine, the case they believe they will be presenting, but also must anticipate their eventual unemployment and do in advance whatever additional preparation the pro se defendant’s case will require.