noting that an inference that an employer was concerned about the employee’s potential in-court testimony was insufficient evidence to support an allegation that the employee was asked to commit perjury
How later courts described this case
- noting that an inference that an employer was concerned about the employee’s potential in-court testimony was insufficient evidence to support an allegation that the employee was asked to commit perjury
- providing an exception to the rule that at-will employees are terminable at will where the employee’s discharge is “contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy as evidenced by existing law”
- providing a narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, under which employees who are terminated in violation of certain fundamental and well- defined public policies may bring civil actions for wrongful discharge against their employers
- stating: “The determination of whether the public policy asserted is a well-defined and fundamental one is an issue of law and is to be made by the trial court.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DAY, J.
(concurring in result). I concur with the result of the majority opinion affirming the court of appeals directing dismissal of Mr. Brockmeyer’s complaint. However, I disagree with the majority’s recognition of a cause of action for allegedly wrongful discharge in “at will” employment contracts based on “public policy” violations.
“At will” contracts are employment contracts that up to the majority opinion have no time duration and may be terminated at will by the employer or employee at any time “for any reason or for no reason.”
The law in this state has been that there is no cause of action for wrongful discharge in at will employment contracts. As the late Chief Justice Horace Wilkie observed in 66 Wis. 2d 53, 63 , 224 N.W.2d 389 (1974) footnote 16:
. “In the absence of contrary statutory or contract provisions, an employer may discharge his employees for any reason without incurring liability therefor. Kovachik v. American Automobile Asso., 5 Wis. 2d 188 , 92 N.W.2d 254 (1958) ; See also: Klug v. Flambeau Plastics Corp., 62 Wis. 2d 141, 148, 149 , 214 N.W.2d 281 (1974) ; Goff v. Massachusetts Protective Asso., Inc., 46 Wis. 2d 712, 715, 716 , 176 N.W.2d 576 (1970) ; Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 393 , 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967).”
*580 The majority has created this new right in this and the case of Scarpace v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., et al., 113 Wis. 2d 608 , 335 N.W.2d 844 (1983), both of whose claims are held meritless under the new rule announced by the majority.
I see no need for this addition to the legal hurdles that must be jumped over before “at will” employment contracts can be terminated. The majority opinion demonstrates that the Wisconsin legislature has been very active in this area and has set forth numerous rights that may not infringed in discharging even an “at will” employee. Federal law provides additional safeguards to employees.
The majority, recognizing that Pandora’s Box may have an attractive cover, has rejected “bad faith” as giving rise to a cause of action for wrongful discharge but then has proceeded to create a new right defined as:
“A wrongful discharge is actionable when the termination clearly contravenes the public welfare and gravely violates paramount requirements of public interest. The public policy must be evidenced by a constitutional or statutory provision. An employee cannot be fired for refusing to violate the constitution or a statute. Employers will be held liable for those terminations that effectuate an unlawful end.” P. 573.
Does “statutory provision” include the myriad of regulations that have the force of law? Does it apply to the employer who is seeking to set up a test case in order to challenge a particular statute or regulation? Does the new cause of action embrace federal as well as state constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations?
The majority says that the new rule will result in “a more stable job market . . .” P. 574. I doubt it. Most likely, more and more discharges that at present are known to be non-actionable will be vehicles to test the ingenuity of the advocate to find some constitutional, *581 statutory or regulatory provision that can be cited in a complaint for “wrongful discharge.” Settlements will often be made of meritless claims to avoid the high cost of litigation. This will be especially burdensome to the small business person.
Is it a two-way street? May the employer sue the employee, who quits, leaving his employer at a crucial time resulting in economic loss because the employer wouldn’t violate some constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision ?
I would leave working out wrongful discharge rights to specific legislation covering that field and defining penalties for violation. The legislature has the advantage of being able to hold hearings, conduct investigations and determine if there are further rights that need to be created to protect the “at will” employee. Certainly neither Scarpace nor this case shows any need for judicial intervention.
I am authorized to state that Justices William G. Callow and Louis J. Ceci join this concurring opinion.