holding that the free and equals elections clause prohibits combining separate and unrelated questions into a single proposition for submission to a vote
How later courts described this case
- holding that the free and equals elections clause prohibits combining separate and unrelated questions into a single proposition for submission to a vote
- referendum that combined in a single proposition whether a property should be acquired and whether bonds should be issued to meet the cost of that acquisition did not consist of separate and unrelated questions
- separate and independent questions may not be combined and submitted to the voters in one proposition in such a way as to place the voter in the position of having to vote for or against both questions when he might otherwise favor one but oppose the other
- establishing prima facie case with ordinance reciting need for recreational center
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting:
I dissent from the majority opinion and would affirm the judgment of the appellate court. The principle is firmly established that a municipal corporation has the right of eminent domain only when the grant of power is specifically conferred by legislative enactment (Department of Public Works and Bldgs, v. Ryan, 357 Ill. 150 ), and that the statute purporting to authorize the exercise of the power will be strictly construed. Harvey v. Aurora and Geneva Ry. Co., 174 Ill. 295 ; Indiana Harbour Belt R.R. v. Green, 289 Ill. 81 .
As stated in the majority opinion, section 11 — 61—1 of the Municipal Code, when enacted in 1949, contained no mention of property in unincorporated areas and the language “including property in unincorporated areas outside of but adjacent and contiguous to the municipality where required for street or highway purposes by the municipality” was added in 1961. In Western National Bank of Cicero v. Village of Kildeer, 19 Ill. 2d 342, at 353 , the court said: “The interpretation placed upon a statute by the legislative department may go far to remove doubt as to its meaning, and it is proper for us to consider the subsequent amendment to a statute in determining the intend and meaning of the statute prior to amendment. [Citations.] The addition of a new provision in a statute by amendment is an indication of the absence of its implied or prior existence.”
Not infrequently, following judicial interpretation of a statute, an amendment is enacted, in which event “[s] uch a statutory change is usually equivocal, suggesting either that the legislative body has effected a conscious change in policy (Western National Bank of Cicero v. Village of Kildeer, 19 Ill.2d 342, 353 ), or that it has simply prevented the recurrence of an erroneous interpretation (People ex rel. Spitzer v. La Salle County, 20 Ill.2d 18, 28 ).” (People ex rel. Clark v. Wheeling, 24 Ill.2d 267, at 269 .) It is noted that there was no appellate decision interpreting section 11 — 61—1 between the dates of its enactment in 1949 and its amendment in 1961.
In its opinion the majority attributes to the amendment a purpose not considered in any prior authorities and concludes that the amendment “was intended to insure a power to condemn, for street purposes, land outside but adjacent and contiguous to the municipality.” The reason for “insuring” a power which has not been questioned is not stated, nor can it be ascertained from the language of the opinion.
Applying long-established principles to the interpretation of the statutes here involved it is apparent that the “broad municipal authority to condemn” to which the majority refers was limited to property within the boundaries of the municipality and the purpose of the 1961 amendment was to broaden the scope of the power to the extent for which it specifically provides.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE UNDERWOOD joins in this dissent.