adopting Leyva and concluding that "[t]he Davis holding obviously applies to instances where suspects attempt to invoke Miranda rights after a knowing and voluntary waiver of those rights. Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights."
How later courts described this case
- adopting Leyva and concluding that "[t]he Davis holding obviously applies to instances where suspects attempt to invoke Miranda rights after a knowing and voluntary waiver of those rights. Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights."
- “Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights. For an initial waiver, however, the State still bears ‘a heavy burden to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived’ Miranda rights.” (quot- ing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 )
- expressing preference for written findings of fact and conclusions of law over oral findings “in order to aid appellate review and to promote accuracy”
- “Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SABERS, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[¶ 45.] I concur except that I would also hold that the State has not proven a valid waiver of defendant’s Miranda rights.
[¶ 46.] As indicated in the majority opinion, the “State must show that (1) the relinquishment of the defendant’s rights was voluntary and (2) the defendant was fully aware that those rights were being waived and of the consequences of waiving them.” (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The State has shown neither. In fact, the record shows that the defendant simply wanted to get out of the police department and stated at least five times that he did not want to waive his Miranda rights. The officer knew he was confused about understanding his rights and took advantage of the situation. {See detailed facts and the cases cited in the majority opinion). Tuttle did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights.