The opinion
MILLER, Chief Justice
(concurring specially).
[¶ 23.] Despite Justice Sabers’ interesting and persuasive argument that SDCL 10-6-33.14 unconstitutionally creates two classes of agricultural land for taxation purposes, I am unable to join him for the following reason.
[¶ 24.] The entire objective of SDCL ch. 10-6, indeed, the function of all SDCL Title 10, is to define and classify land as either agricultural or non-agricultural for taxation purposes. Since the sole function of Title 10 is to classify land for tax purposes, we must set aside our general perception of what constitutes “agricultural land;” it does not matter how we would ordinarily or initially classify it outside a taxation context. The very nature of SDCL Title 10 requires that, regardless of how it would be characterized in a non-tax setting, all land is either classified agricultural or non-agricultural and then taxed accordingly.
[¶ 25.] Our Constitution and case law make it clear that for tax purposes, the Legislature is free to make as many classifications of non-agricultural land as it deems necessary. However, it is limited to only one class of agricultural land. See S.D. Const. Art. VIII, § 15; Gould v. Pennington County Bd. of Equalization, 1997 SD 129 ¶ 8 , 570 N.W.2d 846, 848 ; Great N. Ry. v. Whitfield, 65 S.D. 173 , 272 N.W. 787 (1937). Beyond that limitation, the Legislature can define its sole class of “agricultural land” any way it wants for taxation purposes, so long as it is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. See State v. Black Hills Transp. Co., 71 S.D. 28, 32-33 , 20 N.W.2d 683, 685 (1945) (stating that the power to classify for purposes of taxation is of wide range and flexibility and will not be interfered with unless it is clearly arbitrary or unreasonable).
[¶ 26.] The Legislature’s definition of “agricultural land” at SDCL 10-6-31.3 seems to meet that standard. In addition to using three ordinary, common methods to define agricultural land (income production, principal use, and size), the statute also refers to SDCL 10-6-33.14, which expressly excludes from the definition of agricultural land any land sold for more than 150% of its agricultural income value.. In doing so, the Legislature has not created a second class of agricultural land, as the Thares argue. Rather, it has narrowed the agricultural class by removing from it certain parcels of land that it deems are no longer agricultural.
[¶ 27.] Based on the foregoing analysis, I am persuaded that SDCL 10-6-33.14 could not have unconstitutionally created two classes of agricultural land for taxation purposes. 13 Even though the statute may take land that would ordinarily be described as “agricultural land” (using the common vernacular) and classify it as non-agricultural land for tax purposes, I am persuaded that such action is permitted under the provisions of our Constitution. In our constitutional analysis of SDCL 10-6-33.14, the common, ordinary, everyday definition of “agricultural land” is irrelevant; what is at issue is whether the statute impermissibly creates two agricultural classes. In my view it does not.
[¶ 28.] KONENKAMP, Justice, joins this special writing.
. Whether SDCL 10-6-33.14 creates an unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious definition of agricultural land by relying entirely on sales price may have been a better argument for Thares. That argument, however, is not presented here.