concluding that the prosecutor's comments referring to the defendant as a "monster," "sexual predator," and "pervert," although "abhorrent and misconduct," did not rise to a prejudicial level and were held to have been very unlikely to have altered the jury's verdict
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the prosecutor's comments referring to the defendant as a "monster," "sexual predator," and "pervert," although "abhorrent and misconduct," did not rise to a prejudicial level and were held to have been very unlikely to have altered the jury's verdict
- finding “[t]he prosecutor’s penchant for making statements meant to inflame the passion of the jury and go outside the realm of admissible evidence, is an example of the unprofessional, ‘win-at-all costs’ attitude that scars the judicial system”
- holding prosecutorial misconduct is prejudicial when it “so infect[s] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting convictions a denial of due process”
- finding nonprejudicial misconduct where prosecutor repeatedly called defendant a “monster,” “pervert,” “child molester,” “sexual predator,” and a “tyrant”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 70.] I agree in spirit with Justice Ko-nenkamp’s writing. However, this is the second time this prosecutor’s actions are an issue on appeal. See State v. Stetter, 513 N.W.2d 87, 90 (1994). See also id. at 96-97 (Amundson, J., dissenting).
*358 [¶ 71.] Therefore, I join Justice Amund-son’s dissent on issue four.