suggesting the Legislature intended to curtail hearings on custody modification by requiring a “material” change of circumstances, which should be defined as a significant or important change that has a negative impact on the well-being of the child
How later courts described this case
- suggesting the Legislature intended to curtail hearings on custody modification by requiring a “material” change of circumstances, which should be defined as a significant or important change that has a negative impact on the well-being of the child
- setting forth that the legislative intent of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6 is to make custody determinations as permanent as possible and to curtail repeat “painful, disruptive and destabilizing” custody battles
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NEUMANN, Justice,
concurring specially.
[¶ 55] I write separately only to point out that while I have signed Justice Mar-ing’s concurrence, I agree with much of the majority opinion, including its result. In fact, with the exception of the majority’s citation of Wetch v. Wetch, 539 N.W.2d 309 (N.D.1995), I see very little disagreement between the two opinions.
[¶ 56] I have joined Justice Maring’s opinion because its careful analysis of our prior cases and N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(6) has done much to clarify my understanding of the effect of the statute on our change-of-custody jurisprudence, as well as my understanding of the two-step analysis to be applied by our trial courts since the enactment of the statute. Prior to the enactment of the statute our cases were not always consistent in their articulation of the standard to be applied in deciding a motion to change custody. While, in my opinion, the statute makes no large changes in the standard to be met to change custody of a child, perhaps its new articulation of that standard will help us approach these unhappy cases with greater clarity and confidence.
[¶ 57] WILLIAM A. NEUMANN, J„ concur.