Opinion

In Re Reece

  • 54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1031
  • 341 S.W.3d 360
  • 2011 Tex. LEXIS 393
  • 2011 WL 2112786
Court
Texas Supreme Court
Filed
May 27, 2011
Status
Published
Author
Johnson
On the bench
Guzman, Jefferson, Hecht, Wainwright, Medina, Green, Lehrmann, Johnson, Willett
Cited by
325 cases
Authority
More cited than 0.1%

stating that civil contempt is “remedial and coercive in nature—the contemnor carries the keys to the jail in his or her pocket since the confinement is conditioned on obedience with the court’s order”

How later courts described this case

  • stating that civil contempt is “remedial and coercive in nature—the contemnor carries the keys to the jail in his or her pocket since the confinement is conditioned on obedience with the court’s order”
  • explaining that “[s]ection 21.002 of the Government Code sets forth the only statutory framework for contempt” and that “[a]ny restrictions on this authority are found in the common law”
  • emphasizing that distinction does not turn on nature of underlying litigation as civil or criminal
  • stating that to be entitled to mandamus relief, a relator must demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court and the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Justice JOHNSON,

dissenting.

The Court of Criminal Appeals has general original habeas jurisdiction, Tex. Const. art. V, § 5; Ex parte Thompson, 273 S.W.3d 177, 181 (Tex.Crim.App.2008), while this Court’s habeas jurisdiction is limited. Our habeas jurisdiction exists in matters where a contemnor is confined because he or she violated “an order, judgment, or decree previously made, rendered, or entered by the court or judge in a civil case.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.002(e).

Although our habeas jurisdiction is limited, our mandamus jurisdiction is broad. See Tex. Const, art. V, § 3(a); Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.002(a). And for the reasons the Court sets out, I agree that our broad mandamus jurisdiction encompasses the matters set out in Reece’s petition. Nevertheless, and as SB International, Inc. argues, Reece substantively petitions this Court for habeas relief. Under the circumstances I would refrain from granting mandamus relief for the reasons Justice *378 Willett sets out in part IV of his dissent, which I join.

Because I disagree that we should grant mandamus relief, I respectfully dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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