observing that Chief Justice JEFFERSON, joined by Justice GREEN and “[a] party generally is not entitled to relief it does not Justice LEHRMANN, dissenting in part. seek” and refusing to sua sponte grant relief that was We must decide whether an expert report gave a “fair not sought
How later courts described this case
- observing that Chief Justice JEFFERSON, joined by Justice GREEN and “[a] party generally is not entitled to relief it does not Justice LEHRMANN, dissenting in part. seek” and refusing to sua sponte grant relief that was We must decide whether an expert report gave a “fair not sought
- stating that a “party generally is not entitled to relief it does not seek”
- observing that "[a] party generally is not entitled to relief it does not seek” and refusing to sua sponte grant relief that was not sought
- “We do not believe it proper to sua sponte grant relief Brown has not sought.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice O’NEILL,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree fully with the Court’s conclusion that Property Code sections 21.019 and 21.0195 do not authorize the award of all *371 fees and expenses under these circumstances. I dissent only because I would remand the case, rather than render judgment, so that the trial court may consider imposing any sanctions available under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Tex.R. Civ. P. 18 (authorizing sanctions when a pleading is groundless or not brought in good faith); Tex.R. Civ. P. 70 (permitting a trial court to require a party whose amended or supplemental pleading surprises and prejudices another party to pay the additional costs and expenses incurred by the surprised party as a result of the surprise); Tex.R. Crv. P. 215 (providing for sanctions when a party abuses or fails to comply with discovery proceedings and requests).
As the Court notes, we recently held that such sanctions against a condemning authority are available because Property Code section 21.018(b) stipulates that condemnation trials are to be conducted in the same manner as any other civil trial. PR Invs. & Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. Texas, 251 S.W.3d 472, 480 (Tex.2008). As we noted in PR Investments, appropriate sanctions under the Rules of Civil Procedure may not constitute the entirety of the fees and costs; for example, perhaps only the costs associated with the untimeliness of the amendment to the petition are available here. Because PR Investments was decided after the trial court’s decision, in the interests of justice and fairness, I would remand to permit the trial court to consider sanctions under the Rules of Civil Procedure in light of PR Investments.