holding that allegedly prior inconsistent statements made in a mandamus proceeding associated with the case on appeal were not made in a separate proceeding as required for judicial estoppel
How later courts described this case
- holding that allegedly prior inconsistent statements made in a mandamus proceeding associated with the case on appeal were not made in a separate proceeding as required for judicial estoppel
- explaining that the judicial admission doctrine prevents the use of self-contradiction in a proceeding to gain an unfair advantage
- noting that “religious practices that might offend the rights or sensibilities of a non-believer outside the church are entitled to greater latitude when applied to an adherent within the church”
- noting that “essential function” of related doctrine of judicial estoppel “is to prevent the use of intentional self-contradiction as a means of obtaining unfair advantage”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice GREEN
filed a dissenting opinion.
Because the fundamental principles of Texas common law do not conflict with the Free Exercise Clause, courts can and should decide cases like this according to neutral principles of tort law. See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-90 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 , 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-06 , 99 S.Ct. 3020 , 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979). If a plaintiffs case can be made without relying on religious doctrine, the defendant must be required to respond in kind. 1 Though not always a simple task for courts, “the promise of nonentanglement and neutrality inherent in the neutral-principles approach more than compensates for what will be occasional problems in application.” Jones, 443 U.S. at 604 , 99 S.Ct. 3020 . In contrast, today’s decision ignores the rule that “courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim,” Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 , replacing it with a far more dangerous practice: a judicial attempt to “balance against the importance of general laws the significance of religious practice,” id. at 889 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. 1595 . “The First Amendment’s protection of religious liberty does not require this.” Id. at 889 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 . The trial court heeded these admonishments, but the Court today does not. For these reasons, and for those expressed by the Chief Justice, I respectfully dissent.
. This case is not about sanctioning voluntary religious practices. If Schubert had consented to the church's actions, the consent — under our familiar, neutral principles of tort law — would have completely defeated her claims. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a) (assault elements); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex.2002) (false imprisonment elements); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892A (1979) (effect of consent); cf. Tex. Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore, 595 S.W.2d 502, 508 (Tex.1980) (consent as a matter of law). The jury, however, found that Schubert had not consented, and Pleasant Glade does not challenge that conclusion. When faced with an otherwise valid tort claim, Pleasant Glade’s religious motivation is not a defense. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-90 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 .