explaining that the test for substantive unconscionability encompasses the parties’ general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular case to determine if the arbitration agreement is so one-sided that it is unconscionable
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the test for substantive unconscionability encompasses the parties’ general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular case to determine if the arbitration agreement is so one-sided that it is unconscionable
- stating that just because the plaintiffs “would not have been able to buy the manufactured home unless they signed the arbitration agreement does not, in and of itself, make the agreement substantively unconscionable”
- holding that a third-party may enforce contract terms when it was not a party if contracting parties intended the contract to benefit the third-party and the contract wás entered into for the third-party’s benefit
- rejecting a claim that We agree that if the discovery limitations the arbitration an arbitration provision was substantively unconscionable agreement imposes operate to prevent effective presentation © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 19 In re Poly-America, L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337 (2008) 156 Lab.Cas. P 60,669 , 28 IER Cases 140 , 51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1237 where the challenged provision “effectively incorporate[d] established provisions of contract law”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice O’NEILL,
concurring.
In my view, the unilateral right that the retail contract conferred on the manufacturer to compel or avoid arbitration with the parties to that contract after the events giving rise to the Ripples’ claim arose rendered the contract’s arbitration clause unconscionable as to the manufacturer and non-binding on the Ripples. See J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223 , 230 & n. 2 (Tex.2003). Because I agree with the trial court and the court of appeals on this point, I do not join part IV, A, of the Court’s opinion. Nevertheless, the Ripples’ claims against the manufacturer in this case necessarily rely on the terms of the retail contract and raise substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct; accordingly, I believe the Ripples are equitably estopped from seeking to avoid arbitration with the manufacturer. See, e.g., Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524 (5th Cir.2000). On this basis, I concur in the Court’s judgment.