holding school districts had standing to bring claims against the State asserting that school financing system had become unconstitutional
How later courts described this case
- holding school districts had standing to bring claims against the State asserting that school financing system had become unconstitutional
- stating that "the State has chosen to rely heavily on school districts to discharge its duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education"
- noting that the Legislature may pressure school districts to tax at maximum rates "[b]y authorizing local-option homestead exemptions, knowing that some constituencies will insist on them”
- holding that school districts had standing to sue under the Declaratory Judgments Act
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice ENOCH
filed a concurring opinion.
In 1995,1 wrote that Senate Bill 7 1 was, in my opinion, unconstitutional. 2 That is still my opinion. But that question was decided to the contrary by the Court then, and the question before us is only what must a school district plead to demonstrate a claim that Senate Bill 7 operates unconstitutionally now. On this narrow question, I generally agree with the Court’s opinion and with its judgment. Therefore I concur.
I write separately to note that I too make a distinction between “accreditation” and “general diffusion of knowledge.” But I disagree with the Court’s conclusion that whether a violation under Texas Constitution article VIII, section 1-e 3 has occurred can be demonstrated simply by alleging that the school district must tax at the rate set by the State to provide for a general diffusion of knowledge rather than accreditation.
For a prohibited state property tax to exist, the Legislature must both dictate the tax to be collected and dictate what is *586 to be done with the tax. 4 Under the Texas Constitution, it is the Legislature that must provide for the general diffusion of knowledge, not the school districts. 5 The Court slides over this distinction by asserting, generally, that the Legislature has chosen to satisfy its obligation to provide for the general diffusion of knowledge through school districts, and thus, this equates to ordering the school districts to provide for the general diffusion of knowledge. 6 I am not persuaded. The Legislature, through the Texas Education Code, requires only that school districts provide an accredited education. 7
On the narrow question before us, I agree with the Court that the school districts should be afforded the opportunity to plead that they must tax at the tax rate set by the State to provide an accredited education. But I do not agree that the school districts can assert the need to provide for a general diffusion of knowledge and implicate an impermissible state ad valorem property tax.
That said, I join the Court’s judgment to remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
. Act of May 28, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 347, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 1479 .
. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 750 (Tex.1995) [.Edgewood IV] (Enoch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
. Tex. Const, art. VIII, § 1-e.
. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 737 (quoting Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 502).
. See Tex. Const, art. VII, § 1.
. 107 S.W.3d 584 .
. See Tex. Educ.Cope §§ 39.071-.076.