stating that while it was “guided by Barker’s general approach for analyzing speedy trial claims,” it could give its own meaning to Barker *465 factors under its state constitutional speedy-trial provision
How later courts described this case
- stating that while it was “guided by Barker’s general approach for analyzing speedy trial claims,” it could give its own meaning to Barker *465 factors under its state constitutional speedy-trial provision
- concluding that defendant was not deprived of right to speedy trial where absence of prejudice outweighed length of delay, reasons for delay, and assertion of right
- abrogating in part City of Billings v. Bruce, 290 Mont. 148, 965 P.2d 866 (1998)
- providing that in a speedy trial analysis the court “first identifies each period of delay in bringing the accused to trial” and then “attributes each period of delay to the appropriate party”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE RICE
specially concurring.
¶ 184 Because I believe the Opinion accurately interprets and states the law, I have joined it. I write only to bemoan the law’s complexity. Incorporation of all the speedy trial factors, as previously and newly interpreted, has led herein to creation of, I fear, the “mother of all balancing tests.” The outline of the principles governing application of the factors which the Court has included in ¶113 is helpful and appreciated, and I regret only that this summary of the test requires three single-spaced pages. I sincerely wish the best to counsel and the trial courts in working with these principles, and in making a record thereof. I also look forward to the day when I see a seminar topic or law review article entitled “Toward a Simpler Speedy Trial Analysis.”
JUSTICE MORRIS, JUSTICE LEAPHART and JUSTICE WARNER join the concurring opinion of JUSTICE RICE.