holding statements to police officers or government agents are presumed nontestimonial if the declarant had an objective reason to believe the “statement would serve only to avert or mitigate an imminent or immediate danger and the agent who received the statement had no intent to create evidence”
How later courts described this case
- holding statements to police officers or government agents are presumed nontestimonial if the declarant had an objective reason to believe the “statement would serve only to avert or mitigate an imminent or immediate danger and the agent who received the statement had no intent to create evidence”
- applying the third Crawford formulation and holding an excited utterance during a 911 call to be nontestimonial
- “[W]hen a declarant speaks with her neighbor across the backyard fence, she has much less of an expectation that the government will make prosecutorial use of those statements.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE COTTER
dissents.
¶193 I join in the foregoing dissent. I write to add that I did participate as a member of the majority in Cameron. See, ¶¶ 171-179. Having now received the benefit of Justice Nelson’s exhaustive analysis on the subject of Crawford and the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, I agree with his conclusion that Cameron was wrongly decided.