concluding that Garrymore’s argument under Article II, Sections 24 and 26 was “too undeveloped to undertake a distinctive application of state constitutional principles”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that Garrymore’s argument under Article II, Sections 24 and 26 was “too undeveloped to undertake a distinctive application of state constitutional principles”
- applying Lenihan exception to unpreserved objection that statutorily authorized parole restriction violated § 46-1-401, MCA, and related federal and state constitutional rights
- declining to address argument that was “too undeveloped to undertake a distinctive application of state constitutional principles”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Christopher Lewis, 365 Mont. 431 (2012)
State v. Garrymore, 2006 MT 245, 334 Mont. 1, 145 P.3d 946, is inapposite because the issue was not whether the proper statutory requirements were followed -as it is here -but whether the parole eligibility restriction in and of itself violated Garrymore’s federal and state constitutional and statutory rights.
The opinion
JUSTICE COTTER,
specially concurring.
¶151 I concur in Justice Nelson’s conclusion that now, rather than later, is an appropriate time to clear up the inconsistencies in our Lenihan jurisprudence. Therefore, I join in the discussion and proposed resolution set forth in ¶¶ 45-106 of Justice Nelson’s Special Concurrence. I write separately to note that I concurred with the Court’s resolution in State v. Micklon, 2003 MT 45 , 314 Mont. 291 , 65 P.3d 559 , on the grounds that since it was Micklon who initiated the request for leniency as to the restitution requirements, he should not now be heard to quarrel with the result. I still believe this is so. However, to the extent that our decision in Micklon might be construed to preclude a Lenihan challenge under other circumstances, I would agree that the conclusion reached by Justice Nelson in ¶ 101 is legally correct.