stating that we may discretionarily review claimed errors that implicate a criminal defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights, even if no objection was made in the lower court, where failing to do so may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, may leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings, or may compromise the integrity of the judicial process
How later courts described this case
- stating that we may discretionarily review claimed errors that implicate a criminal defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights, even if no objection was made in the lower court, where failing to do so may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, may leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings, or may compromise the integrity of the judicial process
- holding that the law in effect at the time of the commission of the crime controls as to the possible sentence
- discussing this Court’s “inherent power and paramount obligation to interpret Montana’s Constitution and to protect the various rights set forth in that document”
- overruled in part by State v. Gallagher, 2001 MT 39, ¶ 21, 304 Mont. 215, 19 P.3d 817
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by State v. Gallagher, 304 Mont. 215 (2001)
276 Mont. 126, 134 , 915 P.2d 208, 213 (1996), overruled on other grounds State v. Gallagher, 2001 MT 39, ¶ 21 , 304 Mont. 215 , 19 P.3d 817
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Minez, 318 Mont. 478 (2003)
Finley is readily distinguishable.
The opinion
JUSTICE ERDMANN
specially concurring.
I concur with Justice Nelson on Issues 2, 4, and 5.1 join in Justice Gray’s special concurrence on Issue 1, and I specially concur with Justice Nelson’s holding on Issue 3 to emphasize what I believe should be the narrow scope of its holding.
This Court has previously held that if a trial court determines that the defendant and his counsel have a conflict so great that it results in a total lack of communication, or if counsel fails to render effective assistance, new counsel should be appointed. State v. Zackuse (1991), 250 Mont. 385, 385 , 833 P.2d 142, 142 (citing State v. Martz (1988), 233 Mont. 136, 139-40 , 760 P.2d 65, 67 ; State v. Pepperling (1978), 177 Mont. 464, 472-73 , 582 P.2d 341, 346 ).
In the present case, the District Court conducted a post-trial hearing to determine the effectiveness of Finley’s counsel. The court asked Finley to explain his complaints about his lawyer and then allowed Finley’s counsel to take the stand and rebut the allegations. I agree with Justice Nelson when he states that a “conflict of interest such as the one present here, where counsel takes the stand in opposition to his client and to rebut his client’s allegations of ineffectiveness, renders the assistance of that counsel ineffective for purposes of that proceeding.” I therefore concur with the Court’s opinion that the District Court should have determined that Finley and his counsel had a conflict of interest so great that Finley should have been appointed new counsel, at least for the purpose of the competency hearing.
I write separately to emphasize that the Court’s opinion correctly qualifies its holding by stating that “[o]n the facts here, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in not appointing counsel to represent Finley at the post-trial hearing.” (Emphasis added.) This Court’s longstanding rule for determining when a district court should appoint new counsel when allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are made is set forth in Zackuse and should remain intact. The Court’s opinion should not be read to require appointment of new counsel whenever an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is made in district court.