Although rape trauma syndrome is a relatively new psychiatric development “the presence of rape trauma syndrome is detectable and reliable as evidence that a forcible assault did take place.”
How later courts described this case
- Although rape trauma syndrome is a relatively new psychiatric development “the presence of rape trauma syndrome is detectable and reliable as evidence that a forcible assault did take place.”
- “Psychiatric testimony [regarding PTSS and RTS] is admissible to aid a jury in determining whether there was consent to engage in a sexual act which all parties agree occurred. It remains up to the jury to determine whether the evidence is credible.”
- testimony of doctor, psychiatric nurse, and psychological counselor that victim had symptoms of rape trauma syndrome held admissible
- on issue of consent, expert’s testimony that rape caused PTSD admissible
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MR. JUSTICE SHEEHY,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result in this case, and with what Justice Morrison says in his special concurrence, but dissent from what the majority holds on two issues:
*193 1. The Smith Instruction.
The majority overreaches the issues in summarily setting aside our approval of the instruction in State v. Smith (1980), 609 P.2d 696 . The state is not appealing the instruction, and the overruling of Smith disregards possible cases of prosecutrix malice, to which Smith applied.
2. Cross-examination of the psychiatrist and the nurse.
I think the District Court unfairly limited the cross-examination of the state’s psychiatric witness and of Marjene Tower, the nurse. Post-rape trauma syndrome is far from scientific exactitude. The majority permits such evidence on the basis that “skilled direct and cross-examination” will limit the possibilities for error. Under Rule 705, Montana Rules of Evidence, an expert may be cross-examined on the basis of his opinion, including admissible and non-admissible grounds. The District Court did not permit the kind of full cross-examination that the post-rape trauma syndrome demanded in this case.
I concur in the result here because the Smith instruction ruling does not affect Liddell’s case on appeal, and because I find the jury decided the issue on a test of credibility between him and the prosecutrix which was not substantially aided by the testimony of the psychiatrist and the nurse.