finding that the offered evidence would not have been probative of veracity, the court noted that “[t]here was no competent evidence that the [witness’ previous allegations] were false. That the charges were dismissed does not by itself establish their falsity”
How later courts described this case
- finding that the offered evidence would not have been probative of veracity, the court noted that “[t]here was no competent evidence that the [witness’ previous allegations] were false. That the charges were dismissed does not by itself establish their falsity”
- holding that although victim can be Gross-examined about specific conduct if it goes to her untruthfulness, the fact that the prior accusation of sexual misconduct was dismissed does not mean that it was false
- recognizing that evidence of the defendant’s sexual mores and good character functioned to establish his reputation "for morality and personal truthfulness—conduct and beliefs inconsistent with the charges filed against him”
- holding that although victim can be cross-examined about specific conduct if it goes to her untruthfulness, the fact that the prior accusation of sexual misconduct was dismissed does not mean that it was false
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by CITY OF KALISPELL v. Miller, 355 Mont. 379 (2010)
While the district court’s ruling in Anderson is distinguishable from several other cases in which we have noted the well-known exception to the general provision against leading questions exists when the witness is a child (see State v. Eiler, 234 Mont. 38, 46, 762 P.2d 210, 215 (1988) and Bailey v. Bailey, 184 Mont. 418, 421, 603 P.2d 259, 261 (1979)), we held that the district court did not abuse it
The opinion
MR. JUSTICE SHEEHY,
dissenting:
I dissent on at least two grounds.
First, I do not agree that the District Court properly excluded evidence of the changing theories of the crime committed, as shown by the amendments to the information. This conviction depended on the credibility of the State’s witnesses. The amendments tend to show the inconsistency of the facts being reported to the State by these witnesses. If the variance in the reports being given to the State by the witnesses are of such gravity that the State must withdraw some criminal charges and insert others in their place, the jury in its search for truth should be allowed to know that.
Second, I want to disagree with the majority handling of the Smith instruction, although I agree the instruction was not appropriate in this case. The majority, though, relies on State v. Liddell [ 211 Mont. 180 ,] 685 P.2d 918 . (83-276). Montana Supreme Court, decided July 10, 1984), for the proposition that the Smith instruction is improper. The Smith instruction was not raised as an issue by the defendant in Liddell ; this Court gratuitously undertook to wipe it out. Here the principle of Smith does not apply. There is *302 no victim malice involved and there is corroborative testimony.