explaining that “[grabbing [an officer’s hand], on its own, is not necessarily ‘violent force’ ”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “[grabbing [an officer’s hand], on its own, is not necessarily ‘violent force’ ”
- indicating that the Department of Homeland Security bears the burden of establishing removability by clear and convincing evidence
- discussing use of Taylor categorical approach in context of determining whether Maryland second-degree assault conviction constituted aggravated felony under the INA
- “[A]s we have repeatedly observed, Maryland’s second-degree assault statute reaches violent and nonviolent touching alike[,] . . . [so] convictions under the statute . . . cannot categorically be crimes of violence.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KING, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
With all respect for my good colleagues, I am not convinced that we should reach out and decide the issues addressed by the majority opinion. The Attorney General has moved for a remand of this matter to the BIA for further .consideration, and we should simply' grant that motion. Notwithstanding the tardiness of the remand request, the reasons spelled out by the Attorney General are valid. The BIA misapprehended the basis of Karimi’s administrative appeal; thus, it should be given the opportunity to correct that error and provide us with a fully considered final decision. There is sufficient justification in the record for the BIA to rule in favor of the Attorney General on the merits, in which case Karimi would be no worse off, and we would likely have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s decision in Descamps to inform our review. Or the BIA might rule in Karimi’s favor, and the Attorney General could thereafter choose to let that ruling stand without appeal. In such an instance, we would be relieved of the obligation to render an unnecessary decision, and the judicial process would operate at its intended efficiency. ’
I respectfully dissent.