noting dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence “is driven by a concern about ‘economic protectionism — that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors’ ” (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74, 108 S.Ct. 1803, 100 L.Ed.2d 302 (1988))
How later courts described this case
- noting dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence “is driven by a concern about ‘economic protectionism — that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors’ ” (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74, 108 S.Ct. 1803, 100 L.Ed.2d 302 (1988))
- recognizing the Supreme Court “has repeatedly made clear that there is no constitutional right to obtain all the information provided by [freedom of information] laws”
- explaining the concept of the "dormant Commerce Clause" (quoting Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 , 96 S. Ct. 2488, 2496 , 49 L. Ed. 2d 220, 229 (1976))
- finding there is no constitutional right to obtain all the information provided by freedom of information act laws as no such right was recognized at common law
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice THOMAS, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion. Though the Court has properly applied our dormant Commerce Clause precedents, I continue *1721 to adhere to my view that "[t]he negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application, and, consequently, cannot serve as a basis for striking down a state statute." Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59 , 68, 123 S.Ct. 2142 , 156 L.Ed.2d 54 (2003) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).