observing that the record need not include an "explicit finding" of manifest necessity, that it need only "adequately disclose" the basis for the trial court's decision, and that extensive argument by counsel may be used to inform the reviewing court of the trial court's decision
How later courts described this case
- observing that the record need not include an "explicit finding" of manifest necessity, that it need only "adequately disclose" the basis for the trial court's decision, and that extensive argument by counsel may be used to inform the reviewing court of the trial court's decision
- establishing an “abuse of discretion” standard of review if the trial court performed a factual analysis and a “de novo” standard of review if the trial court performed a legal analysis
- “ ‘if ... a jury could conclude that the lesser included offense was committed but not the greater, then it is reversible error for a trial court to not give an instruction, when requested, on the inherently or factually included lesser offense.’ ”
- where the trial court does not make an explicit finding as to whether a serious evidentiary dispute existed, “we will presume that the trial court followed controlling precedent and applied” the law
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SULLIVAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I see no manifest necessity for a mistrial here. A juror, having twice professed his ability to serve and serve impartially, changed his mind after the trial began (and jeopardy had attached). The State, armed with new information that the juror was a jail chaplain and likely to be favorably disposed to the defendant, moved for a mistrial. This is unlike the Mooberry and Patterson cases cited by Justice Boehm where the trial court declared the mistrial sua sponte, rather than on the motion of the State. 1 See Mooberry v. State, 157 Ind.App. 354, 357 , 300 N.E.2d 125, 127 (1973); Patterson v. State, 495 N.E.2d 714, 719 (Ind.1986).
The fact that the State made the motion for mistrial here is very telling. This strikes me as a classic case of a mistrial affording the State with a second, more favorable opportunity to convict the defendant.
. As to the White case cited by Justice Boehm, it is not clear whether the State moved for a mistrial. While there is reference in Justice Pivarnik's opinion to "a motion for mistrial," White, 460 N.E.2d at 135, it appears to be a reference to an earlier writ proceeding in the same case. The opinion on the writ request also does not make clear whether the State moved for a mistrial or whether the trial court granted it sua sponte. See State ex rel. White v. Marion Superior Court, 271 Ind. 174 , 391 N.E.2d 596 (1979).