holding that it was unnecessary to engage in the three-part Webb test to determine if the school had some other additional duty because our supreme court had already declared the nature of the duty a school owes its students
How later courts described this case
- holding that it was unnecessary to engage in the three-part Webb test to determine if the school had some other additional duty because our supreme court had already declared the nature of the duty a school owes its students
- noting that, unless “the facts are undisputed and lead to but a single inference or conclusion,” “a breach of duty, which requires a reasonable relationship between the duty imposed and the act alleged to have constituted the breach, is usually a matter left to the trier of fact”
- explaining claims brought against government entities under the Indiana Tort Claims Act are subject to the common law theory of contributory negligence which bars a plaintiff’s recovery if the plaintiff was even slightly negligent
- noting that when a duty has already been established, “the focus shifts to whether a given set of facts represents a breach,” adding that “[a]n approach that focuses on rearticulating that duty based upon a given set of facts is misplaced”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SHEPARD, Chief Justice,
concurring.
All five Justices join Justice Rucker's explication of the law on governmental immunity as it applies to this case. The trial court and the court of appeals wrongly held that the school and the Department of Natural Resources were immune.
The trial court was correct, however, to grant summary judgment for the defendants. This is not a case brought under Indiana's Comparative Fault Act, of course, because that Act does not apply to tort claims against government entities. Ind.Code § 84-51-2-2. Instead, this case is governed by the common law, under which even the slightest contributory neg-ligenee by a plaintiff bars recovery. Sauders v. County of Steuben, 693 N.E.2d 16 (Ind.1998).
Thus, to grant summary judgment to the defendants, the trial court need only have been satisfied that a twelve-year-old who smashed live ammunition with a hammer and chisel in the face of his recent firearm safety instruction was minimally negligent as a matter of law. It was not error for the court to reach that conclusion.
SULLIVAN and BOEHM, JJ., concur.