observing, in the context of a challenge under Article I, Section 23, of the Indiana Constitution, that “[b]efore we can determine whether the legislative classification ... is permissible, we need to identify the legislative classification at issue”
How later courts described this case
- observing, in the context of a challenge under Article I, Section 23, of the Indiana Constitution, that “[b]efore we can determine whether the legislative classification ... is permissible, we need to identify the legislative classification at issue”
- holding that the State has a legitimate “interest in protecting fetal life”
- noting State’s claim under Cheaney of a compelling interest from “conception” but only recognizing, without reference to Cheaney, the State’s “interest in protecting fetal life.”
- not addressing standing after trial court relied on federal law to find standing when provider-plaintiffs alleged state constitutional claims
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SHEPARD, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I join in Part I of Justice Sullivan's opinion, but not in Part II, which I think produces the wrong result.
A former colleague of ours onee told us in conference (but never took occasion to say in writing) that for all the jurisprudential effort put into devising standards for trial and appellate review, the most that any articulated standard can achieve is to "tell the judge what mood to be in as he or she approaches a topic." Various standards tell us to be strict or liberal, deferential or non-deferential, to name a few.
The Court correctly announces the standard applicable to the present case. It is that the judiciary should defer to the lines drawn by the General Assembly and Governors Bowen and Bayh unless they are "arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable." Op. at 257, citing Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind.1994).
I cannot say that the decisions made on the very difficult topic of public payments for abortion, made by Indiana's elected representatives (and for that matter by the Congress and President Carter) are so arbitrary and unreasonable that they are unconstitutional.