holding that the statutory requirement that the defendant prove intellectual disability by “clear and convincing evidence” is inconsistent with Atkins and substituting a lower “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof
How later courts described this case
- holding that the statutory requirement that the defendant prove intellectual disability by “clear and convincing evidence” is inconsistent with Atkins and substituting a lower “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof
- holding that defendant's statement to the police was voluntary even though it occurred after the defendant had undergone surgery, was in the intensive care unit, and had been given several doses of morphine
- rejecting the defendant’s argument that requiring his opportunity to speak take place at the close of his case at the penalty phase “allowed the state an opportunity to rebut his claims and this sequence thwarted the purpose of the statutory right to allocution,” because the defendant “had an opportunity to speak on his own behalf” and his statutory right was therefore preserved
- affirming death penalty, notwithstanding court’s erroneous application of “too restrictive” standard to determine “substantial impairment of adaptive behavior,” where record supported conclusion defendant failed to prove significantly subaverage intellectual functioning
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SHEPARD, Chief Justice,
concurring in result.
I join Justice Dickson's views on Part B5 of the plurality opinion. It seems odd at the least to hold that the Supreme Court's declaration that "we leave to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce" the prohibition on executing the retarded, Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 , constituted a command that states are constitutionally bound to definitions adopted by professional groups that do not themselves use the same definition of retardation.
In any event, I write largely to speak about Part VIII on "Appropriateness of Sentence." While I think this Court has been right to regard Article VII, Section 4, as calling upon us to exercise some judgment about the sentences imposed by trial judges, I do not consider it as license to set aside jury decisions on grounds of appropriateness alone. That is the sole claim presented in Argument XIII of Pruitt's brief. When judges were the actual sen-tencers under Indiana's former scheme, I voted multiple times to review the sentence imposed by the trial judge. Now, I would simply say, the legislature has placed the question of appropriateness in the hands of juries.