stating that “[w]here it appears that the Legislature amends a statute to express, its original intention more clearly, the normal presumption that an amendment changes a statute’s meaning does not apply” (citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[w]here it appears that the Legislature amends a statute to express, its original intention more clearly, the normal presumption that an amendment changes a statute’s meaning does not apply” (citation omitted)
- providing that the presumption generally raised by the amendment of a statute (ie., that the amendment changes the statute's meaning) does not apply if it appears that the amendment was passed in order to express the original intent more clearly (citing Indiana Dep't of State Revenue v. Endress & Hauser, Inc., 404 N.E.2d 1173, 1175 (Ind.Ct.App.1980), trans. denied )
- amendment to tax code defining “tangible personal property” clarified existing law when no previous statute defined the term
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DICKSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent, believing that the facts and law of this case warrant our deferring to the determination of the Tax Court which was created "to consolidate tax-related litigation in one court of expertise." State v. Sproles, 672 N.E.2d 1853 , 1357 (Ind.1996).
RUCKER, J., concurs.