holding that application of residency restriction statute, which prohibited those convicted of certain sex offenses from living within 1,000 feet of school property, youth program centers, or public parks, to defendant who had lived at his house for several years before the effective date of the residency restriction statute, was unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto clause of the Indiana Constitution
How later courts described this case
- holding that application of residency restriction statute, which prohibited those convicted of certain sex offenses from living within 1,000 feet of school property, youth program centers, or public parks, to defendant who had lived at his house for several years before the effective date of the residency restriction statute, was unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto clause of the Indiana Constitution
- finding that a residency restriction statute was excessive in relation to protecting children from sex offenders where it did “not consider the seriousness of the crime, the relationship between the victim and the offender, or an initial determination of the xisk of re-offending”
- finding that residency restriction subjected the offender “to constant eviction because there is no way for him or her to find a permanent home in that there are no guarantees a school or youth program center will not open within 1,000 feet of any given location”
- holding that retroactive application of Ohio's residency restriction statute violates the federal Ex Post Facto Clause
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BOEHM, J.,
concurs in result and concurs in the opinion exeept as to Part B3, believing the absence of a scienter element for certain forms of child molesting is not significant in evaluating the punitive character of this statute.