holding that defense counsel’s failure to investigate constituted ineffective assistance of counsel where there was conflicting evidence at trial about the cause of one of the victim’s injuries, counsel only interviewed two or three of the people on a list of 12 or more people that was provided by the defendant to counsel before trial, and counsel failed to locate the eyewitnesses that would have substantiated the defendant’s primary defense that the victim’s injury was caused by a bicycle accident rather than by the defendant
How later courts described this case
- holding that defense counsel’s failure to investigate constituted ineffective assistance of counsel where there was conflicting evidence at trial about the cause of one of the victim’s injuries, counsel only interviewed two or three of the people on a list of 12 or more people that was provided by the defendant to counsel before trial, and counsel failed to locate the eyewitnesses that would have substantiated the defendant’s primary defense that the victim’s injury was caused by a bicycle accident rather than by the defendant
- holding under the Strickland analysis that counsel’s failure to investigate was unreasonable and prejudiced the defendant
- equating the “preponderance of the evidence” standard with “more likely than not”
- applying Strickland, 466 U.S. 688
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
YOUNG, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I believe that the wisdom of deferring to the trial court’s determination whether ineffective assistance of counsel has been demonstrated is a sound policy. See People v Sexton (After Remand), 461 Mich 746, 752 ; 609 NW2d 822 (2000). The trial court, which has first-hand knowledge of the witnesses and the conduct of the trial, is in the best position to assess not only whether defense counsel’s trial performance has been deficient, but whether any such deficiency might have altered the outcome of the trial.
As is aptly demonstrated by the number and variety of opinions this case has generated, this case is one that is highly fact-sensitive and productive of no clear precedent that can provide guidance for future cases. Because I do not believe that the trial court erred in its determinations on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the several hearings it conducted on this question, I would affirm the convictions.
Corrigan, C.J., and Weaver, J., concurred with Young, J.