rejecting an argument that the plaintiff waived any claim for attorney fees by failing to state such a request in its complaint or incorporating it into the final order; the issue was “briefed by the parties, a hearing on the issue took place, and the trial court’s written opinion awarding the fees show[ed] that it thoroughly considered the matter.”
How later courts described this case
- rejecting an argument that the plaintiff waived any claim for attorney fees by failing to state such a request in its complaint or incorporating it into the final order; the issue was “briefed by the parties, a hearing on the issue took place, and the trial court’s written opinion awarding the fees show[ed] that it thoroughly considered the matter.”
- affirming the trial court’s exercise of discretion under MCR 2.601(A) to award attorney fees that were authorized but not requested where both parties had briefed the issue and presented oral arguments
- city’s refusal to rezone property to allow construction of religious facility was not substantial burden on religious institute when other land in jurisdiction was zoned for that use
- "Whenever possible, courts should construe statutes in a manner that renders them constitutional."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KELLY, J.
(concurring). I agree with the order in which the majority opinion interprets the relevant provisions of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 USC 2000cc et seq. I concur in the majority’s holding that there was no individualized assessment in this case and therefore that RLUIPA is not applicable.
I write separately because I believe it is unnecessary to discuss (1) whether the building of an apartment complex was a religious exercise, (2) whether the refusal to rezone plaintiffs property substantially burdened the alleged religious exercise, and (3) whether the alleged burden was in furtherance of a compelling *411 governmental interest and constituted the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The majority’s discussion of these issues is mere dicta.
I would reverse the Court of Appeals judgment because RLUIPA is inapplicable in the instant case.