stating that "the trial court clearly erred by determining that the DHS had shown that the statutory grounds for termination were established" when the court and the DHS failed to "fulfill their statutory duties and make reasonable efforts to reunite respondent and his child"
How later courts described this case
- stating that "the trial court clearly erred by determining that the DHS had shown that the statutory grounds for termination were established" when the court and the DHS failed to "fulfill their statutory duties and make reasonable efforts to reunite respondent and his child"
- noting that the trial court’s and DHHS’s “compliance with the relevant laws and regulations was sorely lacking,” describing the DHHS’s lackluster efforts to involve the respondent, and noting that the trial court “excused” the DHHS’s “failures of notice and communication” even though the trial court held the respondent accountable for his own communication shortcomings
- stating that, as a result of the respondent's inability to participate, "there is a `hole' in the evidence on which the trial court based its termination decision"
- discussing MCL 722.638(1)(a)(i) and stating that “[a] parent abandons, or ‘deserts,’ his child if he is absent for more than 91 days and has not sought custody of his child. MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii).”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WEAVER, J.
(concurring in part). I agree only with the result of the lead opinion, specifically, that the Court of Appeals correctly remanded the case to give the respondent “a fair opportunity to participate.” In re Rood, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 12, 2008 (Docket No. 280597), at 5.
Further, I agree with Justice YOUNG, post at 130 n 13, that because this case is resolved both substantively and procedurally on the basis of Michigan law, the lead opinion, expressing no restraint, unnecessarily attempts to resolve federal questions concerning Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, 42 USC 670 et seq.