holding that a police-citizen encounter is a constitutionally significant seizure “(a) if a law enforcement officer intentionally and significantly restricts, interferes with, or otherwise deprives an individual of that individual’s liberty or freedom of movement; or (b) if a reasonable person under the totality of the circumstances would believe that (a) above has occurred” (emphasis in original)
How later courts described this case
- holding that a police-citizen encounter is a constitutionally significant seizure “(a) if a law enforcement officer intentionally and significantly restricts, interferes with, or otherwise deprives an individual of that individual’s liberty or freedom of movement; or (b) if a reasonable person under the totality of the circumstances would believe that (a) above has occurred” (emphasis in original)
- holding that, “[although it is possible to restrict a person’s liberty and freedom of movement by purely verbal means,” the officer did not do so when he asked the defendant whether she had anything illegal in her purse and if he could search it
- explaining that stops generally must be justified by reasonable suspicion that the person has been involved in criminal activity and arrests must be justi- fied by probable cause that the individual has committed a crime
- explaining that police-citizen encounters fall into three categories — mere conversation, stops, and arrests — and that a stop is a seizure that must be supported by a “safety emergency or by reasonable suspicion”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KISTLER, J.,
concurring.
I join in the majority opinion in this case. I also agree with the principle stated in Justice Durham’s concurring opinion that defendant’s voluntary consent provides an alternative basis for affirming the trial court’s judgment.
Linder J., joins in this concurring opinion.