holding that the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim recognized in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) concerning counsel’s failure to advise the defendant about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea did not have a retroactive effect
How later courts described this case
- holding that the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim recognized in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) concerning counsel’s failure to advise the defendant about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea did not have a retroactive effect
- holding that the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim recognized in Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356 (2010) concerning counsel’s failure to advise the defendant about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea did not have a retroactive effect
- recognizing that the Supreme Court “announced a new rule in Padilla. Under Teague[ v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) ], defendants whose convictions became final prior to Padilla therefore cannot benefit from its holding”
- recognizing that, before Padilla, “lower courts…almost universally” held that the Sixth Amendment did not require defense attorneys to advise defendants about non-criminal consequences of a plea, such as deportation or inadmissibility
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth, Aplt v. Descares, 635 Pa. 395 (2016)
According to the Commonwealth, Chaidez is distinguishable because the defendant therein was convicted of federal charges and was able to collaterally attack her conviction through a petition for habeas corpus, the statute which, unlike the PCRA, does not expressly state that it is the sole means of obtaining collateral relief.
Distinguished by United States v. Castro, 27 F. Supp. 3d 284 (2014)
” In response, Castro filed three different motions arguing essentially that the Supreme Court’s holding in Chaidez is inapplicable to situations of affirmative misrepresentation (he contends that Chaidez only applies when a criminal lawyer fails to advice about immigration consequences), and .that the Court should follow the non-binding Second Circuit’s holding in Kovacs v. United States, 744 F.3d 44 (2nd Cir.2014).
The opinion
Justice Thomas,
concurring in the judgment.
In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. 356 (2010), this Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires an attorney for a criminal defendant to apprise his client of the risk of deportation created by a guilty plea. I dissented. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,” an accused enjoys the right “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” By its terms, this right extends “to legal *359 advice directly related to defense against prosecution of the charged offense,” and “[tjhere is no basis in text or in principle” to expand the reach of this guarantee to guidance concerning the collateral consequences of a guilty plea. Id., at 389-390 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Today, the Court finds that Padilla announced a new rule of constitutional law and that, under our decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), “defendants whose convictions became final prior to Padilla therefore cannot benefit from its holding.” Ante, at 358. I continue to believe that Padilla was wrongly decided and that the Sixth Amendment does not extend—either prospectively or retrospectively—to advice concerning the collateral consequences arising from a guilty plea. I, therefore, believe that the Teague analysis is unnecessary and thus concur only in the judgment.