holding that the Secretary’s position in promulgating the regulation was substantially justified, despite later invalidation of the regulation, because “there was no pri- or disapproval of or challenge to the regulation”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the Secretary’s position in promulgating the regulation was substantially justified, despite later invalidation of the regulation, because “there was no pri- or disapproval of or challenge to the regulation”
- finding the Secretary’s position substantially justified where, inter alia, the “case was one of first impression” and “there was no prior disapproval of or challenge to the [Secretary’s interpretation]”
- rejecting reimbursement for time spent on motions for extended time due to inefficient workload management
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STEINBERG, Judge,
concurring:
I write separately to express my continued disapproval of the analysis and holding in Felton v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 276 (1994) [hereinafter Felton II]. See id. at 287-94 (Steinberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). I maintain my belief that Felton II was wrongly decided, and thus, were it not for its precedential force, I would vote to grant the application in this case, for the reasons stated in my dissent in Felton II, supra. I am, however, constrained by the Felton II holding to join in this order, albeit reluctantly. See Bethea v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 252, 254 (1992) (“[w]here there is an earlier panel ... opinion, we apply a rule that in a subsequent case, a panel or single judge may not render a decision which conflicts materially with such earlier panel”).